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CASE STUDY OF A TAKING UNDONE 
PETER P. FENTON* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article consists of a case study illustrating how an eminent 
domain taking of real estate came undone. This issue arose in the 
context of an attempt by a municipal administration to erect a new 
civic stadium with private financing in the city of Springfield, Mas­
sachusetts. To appreciate the intricacies of the case, this Introduc­
tion provides the factual and legal background which gave rise to 
the controversy. 
Based upon his belief that downtown revitalization would im­
prove the overall quality of life for Springfield residents, Michael J. 
Albano, Mayor of Springfield, made downtown revitalization a key 
goal of his administration. An important part of his revitalization 
plan involved bringing professional minor league basebalP back to 
* City Solicitor, City of Springfield Law Department. Western New England 
College School of Law (J.D. 1980). Although this case study was prepared under the 
direction and supervision of the City Solicitor, the final work product reflects a joint 
effort by the Law Department lawyers who worked on the case, including: Harry P. 
Carroll, Deputy City Solicitor; Patricia T. Martinelli, Chief of Litigation; Kathleen T. 
Breck, Associate City Solicitor; and Edward M. Pikula, Assistant City Solicitor. Each 
attorney contributed materials to the various areas according to their individual in­
volvement and efforts during the course of the litigation. 
1. Sports and recreation have a unique significance for Springfield, which is the 
birthplace of basketball. Mayor Albano believes that a new civic stadium in Springfield 
would promote the city's general welfare by improving the quality of life for city re­
sidents and bolstering the city's image as an entertainment and tourist center. Minor 
league baseball is a form of affordable entertainment. Families can attend games for 
less than the cost of going to the movies. Adding baseball to Springfield's mix of attrac­
tions would improve the quality of life in the city by bringing the community together 
through a common interest in rooting for the home team. Minor league baseball is an 
activity that is popular among people of all ages and socioeconomic groups. Diverse 
fans would enhance the image of downtown Springfield, strengthen the community, and 
help promote the city's livability. The new stadium would not be used exclusively for a 
professional baseball team. Besides only playing a limited number of games a year, the 
team would have many out of town games when the stadium could be used for other 
public purposes. A civic stadium could be used by young athletes attending Springfield 
public schools to hold important baseball or softball games. Such a stadium could also 
be used to host state semi-finals and final championship games. It would also be availa­
ble to area schools, colleges and universities so they could make use of a new state-of­
the-art sports facility for sporting and civic events. Besides baseball, other family-ori­
265 
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Springfield.2 To accomplish that objective, it was necessary to erect 
a civic stadium. This could only be achieved through the coopera­
tive efforts of the public and private sectors. The Mayor's plan 
called for the city to acquire an appropriate site for the stadium, 
and for the private sector-operating through a not-for-profit cor­
poration-to acquire a baseball team and finance the construction 
of the new civic stadium. Once constructed and paid for, the new 
civic stadium was to be owned by the city. Prior to that time, a 
ground lease between the city and the not-for-profit corporation 
would permit the city to use the new stadium, without rent, for civic 
and public events. A site for the new civic stadium was carefully 
selected to increase social and economic activity in the downtown 
area, particularly during the crucial evening and weekend hours.3 
On September 22, 1999, the City Council voted for orders of 
taking ("Taking Orders") relative to the site for a new civic stadium 
("Site").4 These Taking Orders were then approved by the mayor. 
They were recorded in the Hampden County Registry of Deeds and 
the Hampden Registry District of the Land Court on September 23, 
1999. On September 29, 1999, Deputy City Solicitor Harry P. Car­
roll was asked at a city council subcommittee meeting about the 
legal ramifications of a vote by citizens to overturn the Taking Or-
ented programs, social and civic events could be held in the new civic stadium. A sta­
dium would bring intangible benefits to the city as well. It would make people 
optimistic about the downtown's future. It would provide activities for the entertain­
ment, enjoyment, and pleasure of the citizens. It would be an additional place for pub­
lic gatherings. Having minor league baseball in the city would cause Springfield's name 
to be repeated throughout the Northeast in the sports pages and electronic media, en­
hancing the city's image. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
2. It was determined that the best place for a new civic stadium would be in 
downtown Springfield, where it would complement other projects such as the new Bas­
ketball Hall of Fame and the Convention Center, and further Springfield's joint publicI 
private goal of improving its downtown as a sports and entertainment destination. 
3. Mayor Albano believes that a new civic stadium would bring more people 
downtown. It would provide a needeci opportunity for an affordable family outing, 
generate civic pride, cause greater utilization of the city's existing business base, and 
further the city's efforts to become a major attraction for visitors and businesses. 
Sports, entertainment, and special events have an economic spin-off effect that would 
strengthen city businesses, particularly those located in the downtown area. The base­
ball team was expected to have an operating budget of more than two million dollars, 
much of which would be spent locally. During the baseball season, visiting teams would 
travel to Springfield and remain here for two to four days at a time, and fans attending 
the games would engage in spending. The construction of a new civic stadium was 
expected to create scores of construction jobs over an eighteen-month time frame, in 
addition to fifteen full-time jobs and perhaps as many as one hundred part-time jobs 
during the baseball season. 
4. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (1998) (requiring a city council to make an 
appropriation by a two-thirds vote). 
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ders. Carroll responded that "[c]hallenging an eminent domain 
proceeding by referendum might be unconstitutional."5 In view of 
the significance of this complex legal question and the concerns it 
generated from all levels of city government, Springfield City Solici­
tor Peter P. Fenton directed the city's legal review board to imme­
diately research the relevant law and draft a report. 
On October 8, 1999, Attorney Frank P. Fitzgerald wrote to 
Mayor Albano demanding payment on behalf of his client, Dreison 
Investments, Inc., one of the landowners whose property had been 
taken for a portion of the civic stadium. Late in the afternoon of 
October 12, 1999,454 binding referendum petitions ("Referendum 
Petitions") to the City Council were filed with the City Clerk's of­
fice protesting against the Taking Orders. The Referendum Peti­
tions were transmitted to the election office by the City Clerk for 
certification of signatures on October 13, 1999. 
On October 14, 1999, the city's legal review board completed 
its work. City Solicitor Fenton publicly issued a report to resolve 
the legal question of whether an eminent domain taking by the city 
was subject to a local referendum petition. The report concluded 
that a referendum, if applied to the city's eminent domain taking of 
the Site, would violate the United States Constitution as well as the 
Massachusetts Constitution.6 
The Springfield Board of Election Commissioners' staff re­
viewed the Referendum Petitions. After five days of examination, 
it was determined that 11,020 registered city voters had signed the 
Referendum Petitions. In accordance with state law, the election 
commission certified to the City Clerk, William Metzger, that the 
Referendum Petitions had 11,020 valid signatures.? 
On October 22, 1999, Solicitor Fenton received a copy of a let­
ter from Attorney John S. Leonard on behalf of his client, North­
gate Center LLC, another of the landowners whose property had 
been taken for a portion of the Site. Attorney Leonard's letter al­
leged that his "clients' constitutional rights were violated by the 
city's purported taking of the Northgate Plaza."8 Citing the local 
5. City of Springfield Law Department, Report of the City Solicitor: Eminent 
Domain Referendum 2 (Oct. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Eminent Domain Referendum] (on 
file with the author). 
6. See id. at 58; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (1998). 
7. Thus, the statutory threshold of 12% of registered voters was met. See MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 37 (1998) (requiring 12% of registered voters for a Referendum 
Petition). 
8. Letter from John S. Leonard, attorney for Northgate Center LLC, to Peter P. 
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referendum law, Attorney Leonard contended that the Taking Or­
ders had "been suspended from taking effect" and demanded that 
the city "forthwith cease and desist from taking any action whatso-. 
ever in furtherance of" the Taking Orders.9 
The Taking Orders awarded a total $3,925,500.00 for that tak­
ing. The notices of taking to the former owners of the property 
informed them that they could pick up their checks for payment at 
the city treasurer's office "on or after November 1, 1999."10 City 
Solicitor Fenton informed Matthew E. Donnellan, the Collector/ 
Treasurer of Springfield, of Attorney Fitzgerald's demand for pay­
ment on behalf of his client.ll State law obligated the city treasurer 
"within fifteen days after demand" to immediately make proper 
payment available to the persons entitled thereto.12 This amounted 
to a payment of $1,637,500.00, which was due October 25, 1999. 
City Treasurer Donnellan was also notified that a Referendum Peti­
tion had been filed protesting the City Council's vote and the city's 
eminent domain taking of the property. These circumstances left 
Donnellan in a quandary. He wanted to fulfill his legal obligation 
to make payment for the property taken by the city, but he did not 
want to jeopardize the public interest by paying $1,637,500.00 for 
property subject to a political process (i.e., a local referendum seek­
ing to void the land taking for which payment was due). City Solici­
tor Fenton directed the Springfield Law Department to take 
immediate action to settle the legal issues and terminate the uncer­
tainty and controversy. 
On October 25, 1999, the city of Springfield, its mayor, and 
treasurer (collectively called "City") petitioned a single Justice of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") for a declara­
tion of their rights with respect to a taking of private property by 
eminent domain for a new municipal stadium ("Petition"). The Pe­
tition also sought temporary equitable relief to preserve the City's 
financial and legal interests until such time as the case was decided. 
The Petition asked the court to resolve a conflict between the local 
referendum and eminent domain laws-a conflict with constitu­
tional significance that goes to the root of the government's power 
Fenton, City Solicitor, City of Springfield Law Department (Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with 
author). 
9. Id. 
10. Notice of Taking (Sept. 22, 1999) (on file with author). 
11. The Collectorrrreasurer of Springfield is required to issue all checks payable 
by the City. 
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 7B (1998). 
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of eminent domain and the individual's right to private property. A 
hearing in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was sched­
uled. The parties, however, would not agree to the facts underlying 
the Petition and the Justice transferred the Petition to the 
Hampden County Superior Court for disposition. 
Associate Superior Court Justice, Constance M. Sweeney con­
solidated the Petition with several other cases.13 Judge Sweeney 
recognized that a decisive issue had been raised in one of the newly 
consolidated actions-whether there was a "valid purpose" for the 
eminent domain takings. Judge Sweeney ruled that a trial would be 
held on this issue before dealing with the constitutional issues. Fol­
lowing the trial, Judge Sweeney ruled that there was not a legiti­
mate public purpose for the eminent domain takings and held them 
invalid.14 Consequently, the statutory and constitutional issues 
originally raised by the City in its Petition remain undecided. 
Part I of this Article discusses the unresolved statutory issues 
arising from an attempt to overturn an eminent domain taking by 
means of a referendum petition. The unresolved state constitu­
tional issues are discussed in Part II, while Part III outlines the fed­
eral constitutional issues involved. Part IV of this Article discusses 
the municipality's position concerning the decisive public purpose 
issue and the court's resolution of this dispute. This Article outlines 
the relevant law regarding these unresolved issues and concludes 
that an eminent domain taking is not subject to the referendum 
process. 
I. LOCAL REFERENDUM LAW AS ApPLIED TO EMINENT 
DOMAIN TAKING 
State statutes make it unlikely that a referendum designed to 
overturn a taking by eminent domain would be legally valid. The 
primary reason is that an order taking property by eminent domain 
is not a "measure" within the meaning of that statutory term. Pur­
suant to Massachusetts State Law15 and the charter of the city of 
Springfield ("Charter"), the city council, at the request of any de­
partment, and with the approval of the mayor, may take property 
by eminent domain. On the evening of September 22, 1999, the 
City Council voted to approve four separate orders. The first order 
13. See City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014, 
2000 WL 782971 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000). 
14. See id. at *1; see also infra Part IV.B. 
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, ch. 43 § 30. 
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accepted two grants associated with a baseball stadium in Spring­
field. One of the grants accepted was a Community Development 
Action Grant ("CDAG II"). That order stated that the "City Coun­
cil of the City of Springfield, with the approval of the mayor, hereby 
accepts the CDAG II grant and authorizes the grant funds to be 
expended for the purposes outlined in the grant, including site ac­
quisition ...."16 Three other votes taken that evening ordered that 
the City take certain parcels of land by eminent domain. The 
mayor approved each order on September 22, 1999. Orders taking 
the parcels were recorded in the Hampden County Registry of 
Deeds on September 23, 1999. 
Section 42 of the City Charter, which parallels section 42 of 
chapter 43 of the Massachusetts General Laws allows for a referen­
dum petition challenging "final passage of any measure, except a 
revenue loan order, by the city council."17 Thus, if each order of 
taking qualifies as "final passage of a measure," each is subject to a 
referendum vote. The analysis under the Charter therefore re­
volves around the issue of whether or not the orders of taking are 
"measures." If they are, they are subject to referendum; if they are 
not, then a referendum vote may not be held. 
"Measure" is defined in section 37 of the Charter as "an ordi­
nance, resolution, order or vote passed by a city councilor a school 
committee ...."18 In construing the term "measure," the courts 
have "considered instructive the distinction between legislative and 
executive acts, reasoning that only the former constitute 'mea­
sure[s]' subject to referendum petition."19 Thus, if the orders of 
taking are legislative acts, they may qualify as "measures" subject 
to referendum; if they are deemed executive or administrative acts, 
no referendum vote may be had.20 
In determining whether particular action taken by a city coun­
16. Order for Eminent Domain Taking (Sept. 22, 1999) (recorded at Hampden 
County Registry of Deeds) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Order of Taking]. 
17. Revenue loan order is not specifically defined. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, 
§ 23 (1935) (amended 1935) (referencing revenue loan order but since repealed); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 44, § 5A (1967) (repealed 1969) (same). It appears from the context of 
those two Acts that it pertains to an order of the council to borrow money against 
anticipated revenue. See Act of Mar. 12, 1935, ch. 68, 1935 Mass. Acts 93 (excluding 
revenue loan orders by cities from certain provisions of their charters and their subjec­
tion to referendum); see also Act of Mar. 22, 1967, ch. 73, 1967 Mass. Acts 34 (providing 
for borrowing by cities, towns, and districts in anticipation of revenue). 
18. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 37 (1998) (defining "measure"). 
19. Andrade v. City Council, 547 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Mass. 1989). 
20. See Jordan v. City Clerk, 436 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Murphy 
v. City of Cambridge, 173 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Mass. 1961). 
271 2002] CASE STUDY OF A TAKING UNDONE 
cil is legislative or executive, the courts have noted that the "crucial 
test is 'whether the proposition is one to make new law or to exe­
cute law already in existence."'21 Applying this test and defining 
what is a legislative act has proven difficult. "The line between ex­
ecutive and legislative actions is sometimes difficult to delineate 
and in some instances may be completely obliterated. "22 
In Dooling v. City Council?3 the court described a legislative 
act as "the laying down of a rule, a principle or a law by which the 
conduct of a public officer may be guided."24 Dooling, while not 
addressing the issue of eminent domain, commented: 
It is an act of legislation to authorize the construction of a public 
building, to set a boundary to its cost and to provide money to 
pay for it. But it is an executive act to select a contractor, to 
agree with him as to the thing to be done, the precise price, the 
terms of payment, and the numerous other conditions incident to 
a building contract.25 
Another factor in favor of finding legislative action is if the vote 
amount[s] to a "sweeping determination of municipal policy."26 
21. Moore v. Sch. Comm., 378 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Mass. 1978) (quoting 5 E. MCQUIL. 
LAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.55 (3d rev. ed. 1969)); see also Andrade, 547 
N.E.2d at 929. 
22. Moore, 378 N.E.2d at 50. 
23. 136 N.E. 616 (Mass. 1922). 
24. Id. at 617. 
25. Id. 
26. Gorman v. City of Peabody, 45 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Mass. 1942) (voting to in­
crease salaries of all public school teachers is legislative); cf Fantini v. Sch. Comm., 285 
N.E.2d 433, 435 (Mass. 1972) ("[W]e seriously doubt the applicability of initiative or 
referendum procedures to acts of a school committee with respect to the appointment 
or removal of particular individuals."). For a review of Massachusetts cases in which 
the legislative/executive test was used to determine whether an action taken was a 
"measure" and therefore subject to referendum, see Moore, 378 N.E.2d at 50 (voting of 
school committee to close two public schools involved policy determination common to 
legislative action); Fantini, 285 N.E.2d at 435 (voting by school committee not to reap­
point superintendent is not legislative); Gorman, 45 N.E.2d at 942 (voting to increase 
salaries of all public school teachers is legislative); Dooling, 136 N.E. at 617 (passing 
order by city council authorizing and directing the mayor to execute three contracts was 
not legislative and therefore not subject to referendum); Jordan v. City Clerk, 436 
N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (voting of city council granting special permit is 
an executive function and not subject to referendum petition). But see Andrade, 547 
N.E.2d at 930 (voting by city council determining the percentages of the local tax levy 
to be borne by various classes of real and personal property was an executive rather 
than legislative function and therefore not subject to referendum); LaBranche v. A.J. 
Lane & Co., 537 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Mass. 1989) (concluding that referendum process 
available to challenge an amendment to city's zoning ordinance); Gould v. City Coun­
cil, 465 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Mass. 1984) (stating that where city council had general power 
to authorize lease of city-owned property, vote of city council authorizing the mayor to 
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In Andrade v. City Council?7 the court concluded that the set­
ting of the tax factor by the city council was an executive act. In 
reaching this decision, the court considered: 
[P]rudential concerns of efficient government warrant placing 
certain limitations on the definition of "measure." "In ascertain­
ing the intent of the Legislature with respect to the scope and 
nature of the referendum powers that it has conferred, it is ap­
propriate and important to consider what the consequences of ap­
plying [them] to a particular act of legislation would be, and, if it 
is found that the exercise of those powers tends to destroy the 
efficacy of other governmental mandates, the court ought not to 
place such an interpretation upon the grant of the referendum 
powers as to bring about any such result. "28 
The above-cited proposition is important because it empha­
sizes the consequences of a particular act of legislation in determin­
ing whether that act is subject to referendum. This relaxes the 
legislative/executive test almost to the point of suggesting the fol­
lowing: regardless of whether an act is more legislative than execu­
tive, if the consequence of allowing a referendum vote on such act 
is the destruction of the efficiency of certain governmental man­
dates, then the act should not be subject to referendum. 
There is no Massachusetts case law directly determining the 
question of whether, for purposes of the referendum statute, a tak­
ing of property by a city council is a legislative act. However, case 
law on the legislature's power of eminent domain is informative. In 
City of Boston v. Talbot,29 the court stated: 
The question whether the use for which land is taken under 
the right of eminent domain is a public use is a judicial question, 
and the determination of the Legislature upon it may be revised 
by the court. But if the use for which the taking is made is public, 
the question whether the taking of a particular piece of real estate 
is necessary or expedient is a legislative question, upon which the 
decision of the Legislature, as a tribunal of fact, is conclusive.3D 
enter into a long-term lease was carrying out a legislative function and therefore 
referable). 
27. 547 N.E.2d at 927. 
28. Id. at 930-31 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Gilet v. City 
Clerk, 27 N.E.2d 748, 750 (Mass. 1940». 
29. 91 N.E. 1014 (Mass. 1910). 
30. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Opinion of the Jus­
tices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 (Mass. 1974) ("The power of eminent domain is a legislative 
power .... '[It] is said that the legislature is the sole judge as to the expediency of ... 
exercising the right of eminent domain ... either for the benefit of the inhabitants of 
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Although the above-quoted cases were not referendum cases, 
their language cannot be ignored. Cases from other jurisdictions 
support the position that selection of a site for public use is an exec­
utive or administrative act and is not a legislative one. In City of 
Idaho Springs v. Blackwell,31 the Supreme Court of Colorado ad­
dressed the issue of whether a city council vote to purchase a cer­
tain parcel of land for a new city hall was a legislative or 
administrative vote. Noting that the power of referendum is not 
unlimited and does not grant the right to petition for an election on 
administrative matters, the court stated that the "central inquiry is 
whether the proposed legislation announces new public policy or is 
simply the implementation of a previously declared policy."32 To 
resolve this issue, the court used two tests: first, whether the action 
related to subjects permanent or general in character (legislative), 
as opposed to temporary in operation (executive); and second, 
whether the action was necessary to carry out existing legislative 
policies and purposes (executive or administrative) or whether it 
was a declaration of public policy (legislative).33 The court deter­
mined that the legislative action was the policy decision to build a 
new city hall, which was encompassed in an earlier vote to impose a 
sales tax for that purpose. "The choice of location and structure for 
the new city hall is an act 'necessary to carry out' the existing legis­
lative policy to build a new city hall" and therefore an administra­
tive or executive act not subject to referendum.34 
In Nebraska, in State ex. reI. Ballantyne v. Leeman,35 the court 
addressed the issue of whether the site selection for a municipal 
auditorium by the city council was subject to referendum. The 
court set forth the general rule that "the right to a referendum ... 
is ordinarily confined to those acts of the council which are in the 
exercise of its legislative power and does not extend to administra­
tive or executive acts, even though such acts are exercised by reso­
lution or ordinance."36 The reason for withholding a referendum in 
cases of administrative decisions is that to allow a referendum to 
annul or delay executive or administrative conduct would destroy 
the state or of any particular portion thereof.'" (quoting Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 
Mass. 544, 558 (1868)). 
31. 731 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1987). 
32. Id. at 1254. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1255. 
35. 32 N.W.2d 918 (Neb. 1948). 
36. Id. at 923. 
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the efficient administration of government. "An initiative generally 
is administrative if it is merely ... fact finding [to] effectuate policy 
declared by the legislature."37 
The Ballantyne court held: 
[I]t was an act of legislation to direct and authorize the construc­
tion of a public building, to fix the cost, and provide bonds to pay 
for it, but that it is an executive and administrative duty to select 
the site, buy same, select plans and let a contract, provide precise 
cost of various items, terms of payment, and numerous other con­
ditions incident to building a large municipal auditorium. Not 
one of the many executive and administrative acts necessary to 
complete such project is referable to a vote of the people as a 
legislative act.38 
The Arizona Supreme Court has considered the differences be­
tween legislative acts and administrative acts in determining 
whether an act is subject to referendum.39 The court determined 
whether a city council resolution approving a road improvement 
project by widening specific roads, and taking land in connection 
therewith, was subject to referendum. Prior to the resolution, the 
electorate of the city had approved a $30 million bond issue for the 
public purpose of improving city streets. The bond proposal did not 
mention particular streets. The court concluded that the issuance of 
bonds was a "legislative act. "40 The resolution of identifying partic­
ular streets and taking land for widening them was an administra­
tive act: carrying out the public purpose established in the "bond 
election" and therefore not subject to referendum.41 That the bond 
proposal did not identify particular roads to be improved gave the 
"[c]ity much more leeway in deciding when and where to adminis­
ter the bond funds."42 While this lack of specificity may well have 
been a valid reason to oppose the bond proposal, it did not change 
the council's action in widening particular streets from administra­
tive to legislative.43 
In Monahan v. Funk,44 the Oregon Supreme Court stated that: 
Acts which are to be deemed as acts of administration and 
37. 42 AM. lUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 8 (2000). 
38. Ballantyne, 32 N.W.2d at 923 (emphasis added). 
39. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 821 P.2d 146, 149-50 (Ariz. 1991) (en bane). 
40. Id. at 155. 
41. Id. at 153. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. 3 P.2d 778 (Or. 1931). 
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classed among those governmental powers properly assigned to 
the executive department are those which are necessary to be 
done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already de­
clared, either by the legislative municipal body, or such as de­
volved upon it by the organic law of its existence. The form of 
the act is not determinative; that is, an ordinance may be legisla­
tive in character or it may be administrative. 
The crucial test for determining that which is legislative and 
that which is administrative, is whether the ordinance was one 
making a law or one executing a law already in existence.45 
The court held that where a previous ordinance had authorized the 
City to sell bonds for the purpose of acquiring property for a new 
crematory, a subsequent ordinance purchasing a particular piece of 
property for this use was an administrative act carrying out the pre­
viously adopted policy.46 
There is adverse, but distinguishable, case law. In Paget v. Lo­
gan,47 the court held that the act of the legislative body in selecting 
a site is a legislative act where a specific state statute (a) authorizes 
counties or cities to acquire, construct, and operate a mUltipurpose 
stadium, (b) provides that the ultimate act of site selection belongs 
to the "governing body," and (c) requires the right of eminent do­
main to be exercised by the "legislative body. "48 In allowing an initi­
ative to go forward, the majority opinion also relied on the fact that 
no irrevocable commitments had been made.49 A strong dissent 
stated: 
I find the law clear in its adherence to the rule that the pow­
ers of the initiative and referendum are applicable only to acts 
which are legislative in character. For good and valid reasons, 
the initiative and referendum processes are not available to exec­
utive or administrative acts. And the decision on the site selec­
tion for the multipurpose stadium was an administrative decision 
which could not be decided by the popular vote of the people.50 
The dissent further observed that "[t]he legislative decision 
was made when the people ... earlier decided by popular vote to 
45. Id. at 779-80 (citations omitted). 
46. Id. at 780. 
47. 474 P.2d 247 (Wash. 1970) (en banc). 
48. Id. at 250-51. 
49. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court of Washington departed from this reasoning in 
later cases. See Bidwell v. City of Bellevue, 827 P.2d 339, 341-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing cases where the Supreme Court of Washington had departed from this rational 
as determinative). 
50. Paget, 474 P.2d at 253 (McGovern, J., dissenting). 
276 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:265 
erect a multipurpose stadium and approved the issuance of general 
obligation bonds to finance the construction. The building site was 
merely an implementing decision."51 The dissent went on to cite 
with approval the California case of Simpson v. Hite,52 wherein the 
California Supreme Court held that the selection of a site for cer­
tain municipal and court buildings was administrative and therefore 
not subject to initiative vote. Thus, the court stated: 
If the selection of sites of courts buildings were subject to 
referendum, the electors could nullify every determination of the 
board of supervisors to erect buildings for the courts and thereby 
nullify the legislative policy and prevent execution of the duty 
imposed upon the board of supervisors. Furthermore, a small 
group, or various small groups, of electors, by repeated initiative 
proposals for a change of site, could interfere with the supervi­
sors' attempts to furnish quarters for the courts at any time, even 
when the period for referendum had passed.53 
A review of the case law cited above reveals that courts are 
likely to find the action legislative where it involves a determination 
of municipal policy. With respect to the City of Springfield, the or­
ders of taking were not "legislative." Thus, the orders were not 
"measures" subject to referendum because they were simply the ex­
ecution of the policy set forth in the order appropriating money for 
the acquisition of a site for a baseball stadium. The appropriation 
would be subject to referendum as a legislative action, but the tak­
ings would no1.54 The "legislative" action here was the acceptance 
and appropriation of grant money "for the purposes outlined in the 
grant, including site acquisition, relocation expenses, and costs of 
demolition and development of land in connection with the new 
baseball stadium."55 The orders of taking represented the execu­
tion of that policy and were executive or administrative actions. 
The Referendum Petition did not seek a vote on the acceptance of 
the grant or appropriation of the grant money for purposes of ac­
51. Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 
52. 222 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1950). 
53. Id. at 230. 
54. See Jordan v. City Clerk, 436 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) ("On 
June 19, 1980, the city council resolved that the city would incur debt for the purpose of 
acquiring land for a state-sponsored skating rink. While this legislative action could 
have been made the subject of a referendum petition no such challenge was initiated."); 
see also Dooling v. City Council, 136 N.E. 616, 617 (Mass. 1922) (noting that "[i]t is an 
act of legislation to authorize the construction of a public building, to set a boundary to 
its cost and to provide money to pay for it"). 
55. Order of Taking, supra note 16. 
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quiring a site for the baseball stadium. It only sought review of the 
orders of taking for the particular sites involved. The petitioners 
apparently did not object to the appropriation of money for the ac­
quisition of a site for the baseball stadium. They objected to the 
actual site chosen. The necessity and expediency of appropriating 
money for this project is a legislative act subject to referendum, 
however, the administrative act of selecting the site is not. 
A second point in support of labeling the takings "executive" 
or "administrative" acts is that property can only be taken at the 
request of any department and with the mayor's approval.56 There 
is no provision within the eminent domain statute for an override of 
a mayoral veto. This factor lends more support and credence to the 
position that the orders of taking were executive or administrative 
acts. 
A third point relates to the efficiency considerations voiced in 
Andrade v. City Council. 57 "Initiative and referendum may apply 
only to legislation; administrative acts generally are exempted from 
initiative and referendum. The reason for withholding referendum 
to annul or delay executive or administrative conduct would de­
stroy the efficient administration of government. "58 If each order 
of taking were subject to a referendum vote, then vast road widen­
ing projects, for example, would potentially be subject to hundreds 
of referendum votes and result in considerable delay. Similarly, in 
the present situation, if a referendum vote were held and were suc­
cessful, each successive site selected for the baseball stadium would 
potentially be subject to another referendum vote. 
Notwithstanding the three points above, the language in Ding­
ley v. City of Boston59 and City of Boston v. Talbot60 clearly states 
that eminent domain is a legislative power. If true, exercise of such 
power would seem to be a legislative act. In analyzing the legisla­
tive/executive issue in the context of the referendum provisions, the 
56. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000). The City has a Plan A form of govern­
ment. /d. §§ 46-55; Kaczmarski v. Mayor of Springfield, 193 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 
1963). Under Plan A, the mayor is the chief executive and "every order, ordinance, 
resolution, and vote passed by the city council, and relating to the affairs of the city, 
must be presented to the mayor for his approval." DOUGLAS A. RANDALL & DOUGLAS 
E. FRANKLIN, MASSACHUSETrS PRACTICE: MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 109 (4th 
ed. 1993) (describing the Plan A form of government). In general, a two-thirds vote of 
the council is required to override a veto by the mayor. 
57. 547 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1989). 
58. 42 AM. lUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 8 (2000). 
59. 100 Mass. 544, 558 (1868). 
60. 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 (Mass. 1910). 
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analysis must be that the legislative power of eminent domain is the 
general power to authorize and appropriate money for an eminent 
domain taking. The mechanics of picking a particular site for a 
given project are an administrative or executive function, even 
though the order of taking must be voted on by the city council and 
approved by the mayor. Further evidence of this is the requirement 
in chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts General Laws that 
the taking be "at the request of any department," since presumably 
the department involved would have unique knowledge regarding 
an appropriate site for a particular public project.61 
II. MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION As ApPLIED TO LOCAL 
REFERENDUM ON EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS 
In order to determine whether the local referendum law62 is 
constitutional as applied to an eminent domain taking, two provi­
sions of the Massachusetts Constitution must be considered: part 1, 
article 10 and amended article 48. 
A. Article 10 
Part 1, article 10 of the Massachusetts Constitution ("Article 
10") addresses the power to take property by eminent domain, stat­
ing in pertinent part: 
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in 
the enjoyment of his ... property, according to standing laws. He 
is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of 
this protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent, 
when necessary: but no part of the property of any individual can, 
with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without 
his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people. 
In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not controllable by 
any other laws than those to which their constitutional represen­
tative body have given their consent. And whenever the public 
exigencies require that the property of any individual should be 
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compen­
sation therefor.63 
The phrase "representative body of the people" has been inter­
preted to mean the state legislature.64 Article 10 gives the Legisla­
61. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000). 
62. Id. § 42. 
63. MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1 (emphasis added). 
64. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 (Mass. 1974). 
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ture alone the ability to decide whether to exercise the power of 
eminent domain in a particular instance.65 The Massachusetts Con­
stitution contains no express grant of eminent domain power to the 
people themselves and it should not be construed to confer that 
power implicitly because statutes delegating eminent domain power 
are "in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property 
and must be construed with reasonable strictness ...."66 
Under Article 10, only the "representative body of the people" 
may take private property without the owner's consent.67 The rep­
resentative body of the people of Springfield is the city counci1.68 
The City's Taking Law69 expressly requires that the exercise of emi­
nent domain power be through the city council, at the request of 
any department, and with the approval of the mayor under chapter 
79. Because the Referendum Petitions in the instant case seek to 
override the city council's decision to take the Site, application of 
the local referendum law70 would violate Article 10 of the Massa­
65. Id.; Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544,558 (1868) ("[T]he legislature is 
the sole judge as to the expediency of ... exercising the right of eminent domain ... 
either for the benefit of the inhabitants of the state or of any particular portion 
thereof.") (emphasis added); see also Hellen v. City of Medford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 
(Mass. 1905) (confirming right of the Legislature "to decide absolutely and finally upon 
the necessity of the taking"). 
66. Burnham v. Mayor & Aldermen, 35 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Mass. 1941). 
67. MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1. 
68. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 50 (2000) ("The legislative powers of the city 
shall be vested in a city council ...."). 
69. [d. § 30 ("At the request of any department, and with the approval of the 
mayor and city council under Plan A ... the city council may, in the name of the city, 
purchase, or take by eminent domain, under chapter seventy-nine, any land within its 
limits for any municipal purpose ...."). 
70. Id. § 42 (2000). 
If, within twenty days after the final passage of any measure, ... a petition 
signed by registered voters of the city, ... protesting against such measure or 
any part thereof taking effect, is filed with the city clerk, the same shall there­
upon and thereby be suspended from taking effect; and the city council ... 
shall immediately reconsider such measure or part thereof; and if such mea­
sure or part thereof is not entirely rescinded within twenty days after the date 
of the certificate of the registrars, the city clerk shall submit the same, by the 
method herein provided, to a vote of the registered voters of the city, ... and 
such measure or part thereof shall forthwith become null and void unless a 
majority of the registered voters voting on the same at such election vote in 
favor thereof. 
The petition described in this section shall be termed a referendum petition 
and section thirty-eight shall apply to the procedure in respect thereto, except 
that the words "measure or part thereof protested against" shall for this pur­
pose be understood to replace "measure" in said section wherever it may oc­
cur, and "referendum" shall be understood to replace the word "initiative" in 
said section. 
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chusetts Constitution, which vests exclusive authority to decide 
whether or not to take private property in the "representative body 
of the people."71 That authority cannot be overridden by 
referendum. 
B. Article 48 
The Massachusetts Constitution does not grant the referendum 
power at the local level. Article 48 of the Amendments to the Mas­
sachusetts Constitution ("Article 48") does, however, expressly rec­
ognize that although the legislative power is vested in the General 
Court: 
[Pjeople reserve to themselves the popular initiative, which is the 
power of a specified number of voters to submit constitutional 
amendments and laws to the people for approval or rejection; 
and the popular referendum, which is the power of a specified 
number of voters to submit laws, enacted by the general court, to 
the people for their ratification or rejection.72 
In Article 48, the people expressly reserved to themselves the 
power to ratify or reject laws enacted by the Legislature. The pur­
pose of the referendum provisions in the Massachusetts Constitu­
tion is to enable the people to pass upon action taken by the 
Legislature.73 "A fundamental principle of our system of govern­
ment is that power to make laws for the general welfare is vested in 
the General Court, except as affected by article 48 of the Amend­
ments to the Constitution. That power cannot be surrendered or 
delegated. "74 
The referendum power reserved by the people is not unlimited. 
The Massachusetts Constitution specifically excludes certain sub­
jects from the statewide initiative and referendum provisions of Ar­
ticle 48: 
No proposition inconsistent with anyone of the following rights of 
the individual, as at present declared in the declaration of rights, 
shall be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: The 
right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to 
public use; the right of access to and protection in courts of jus­
tice; the right of trial by jury; protection from unreasonable 
Id. 
71. MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1. 
n. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 1 (emphasis added). 
73. Mass. Atty. Gen. Op. (Apr. 14, 1966). 
74. Opinion of the Justices, 191 N.E. 33, 35 (Mass. 1934). 
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search, unreasonable bail and the law martial; freedom of the 
press; freedom of speech; freedom of elections; and the right of 
peaceable assembly,?5 
Article 48 contains "mandatory" provisions with which the 
General Court and the people must comply,?6 Under these consti­
tutional exclusions, any proposition that is inconsistent with the 
"right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to 
public use" cannot be the subject of a referendum petition. This 
exclusion clearly applies to eminent domain takings because "[t]he 
duty of paying an adequate compensation, for private property 
taken, is inseparable from the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain."77 
Article 48 pertains to laws made by the General Court; it does 
not permit the people to have a referendum upon purely local mat­
ters. That power only exists by statute-specifically, the local refer­
endum law. "A statutory initiative or referendum may be subject to 
the same state and federal constitutional limitations as are the state 
legislature and the statutes which it enacts."78 Although the local 
referendum law does not contain an express exclusion for constitu­
tionally protected rights, Article 48 expressly prohibits a statewide 
referendum on any proposition inconsistent with the right to re­
ceive compensation for an eminent domain taking. The local refer­
endum law should be harmonized with the exclusionary provisions 
in Article 48. 
The local referendum law thus cannot be used to override the 
City's taking of the Site. Article 10 requires that type of decision to 
be made by the "representative body of the people," which is the 
city council.79 In addition, applying the local referendum law to the 
75. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 2, § 2 (emphasis added). Another section of 
Article 48 also provides limitations on referendum petitions: "No law that relates to 
religion, ... or to ... judges; or ... courts; or the operation of ... a particular town, city 
or other political division ... ; or that appropriates money for the current or ordinary 
expenses of the commonwealth ... shall be the subject of a referendum petition." 
MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 3, § 2. 
76. Opinion of the Justices, 34 N.E.2d 527, 539 (Mass. 1941) ("The provisions of 
said article 48 touching the description are mandatory and not simply directory. They 
are highly important. There must be compliance with them."). 
77. Bromfield v. Treasurer & Receiver-Gen., 459 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Mass. 1982) 
(quoting Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. County Comm'rs, 103 Mass. 120, 124 (1869»; 
see also Att'y Gen. v. Boston & A.R Co., 35 N.E.2d 252, 257 (Mass. 1893) ("The power 
to take and the obligation to indemnify for the taking are inseparable." (quoting Drury 
v. Midland RR, 127 Mass. 571, 576 (1879))). 
78. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum § 2 (2000). 
79. MASS. CONST. art. 10. 
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City's taking of the Site would violate the spirit of Article 48's ex­
clusionary provisions that expressly prohibit a referendum upon 
propositions that are inconsistent with the "right to receive com­
pensation for private property appropriated to public use."80 
III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS ApPLIED TO LOCAL 
REFERENDUM ON EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS 
The United States Constitution establishes delicate balance be­
tween the natural right of private property and the inherent govern­
mental power of eminent domain. Application of the local 
referendum law to challenge the City's eminent domain taking of 
the Site would interfere with this carefully crafted balance by violat­
ing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The constitutional provision known as the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment81 guarantees that private property will not be 
taken for a public use without just compensation. The Takings 
Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole. "82 The Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution contains a "guaranty of due process of law."83 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of 
the most important provisions in the Constitution.84 It makes the 
protections in the Bill of Rights binding on both the states and the 
federal government. The constitutional guarantee of due process of 
law prohibits the government from arbitrarily or unfairly depriving 
individuals of basic constitutional· rights. The United States Su­
80. MASS. CaNST. amend. art. 48, pt. 2, § 2. 
81. U.S. CaNST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation."). 
82. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
83. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shaH abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
84. The right to due process of law "has been described as the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered justice." 16B AM. lUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 895 (1998) (foot­
notes omitted). 
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preme Court85 has pointed out that "the core" of the due process 
concept is "protection against arbitrary action. "86 
The Takings Clause in the United States Constitution does not 
provide any right to a referendum. The Takings Clause recognizes 
the inherent governmental power of eminent domain and perma­
nently binds the exercise of that power to the individual's right to 
receive compensation when the government takes his property. A 
legal analysis of the Due Process and Takings Clause illustrates that 
these provisions prohibit a referendum on the eminent domain tak­
ing of the Site. 
The Takings Clause inextricably intertwines the power to take 
property with the duty to pay for it. The Supreme Court has recog­
nized the unbreakable bond as inviolate: 
[I]t was held to be a settled principle of universal law, reaching 
back of all constitutional provisions, that the right to compensa­
tion was an incident to the exercise of the power of eminent do­
main; that the one was so inseparably connected with the other 
that they may be said to exist, not as separate and distinct princi­
ples, but as parts of one and the same principle; and that the 
legislature "can no more take private property for public use 
without just compensation than if this restraining principle were 
incorporated into and made part of its state constitution."87 
After a taking has occurred, the permissible areas of challenge 
are confined to the purpos~ of the taking and compliance with the 
appropriate statutory process.88 In this particular instance, the mo­
ment the Taking Orders for the Site were recorded in the Registry 
85. "[T]he Fifth Amendment ... declares that no person shall 'be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.' The Fourteenth Amendment declares 
that no state shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law,' and is a limitation only upon ... the state." Id. § 890 (citation omitted). 
86. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,845 (1998) (citations omitted); 
see also 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.01 (rev. 3d ed. 2000) (observing that 
"[t]he constitutional protections of due process as they relate to eminent domain serve 
as the basis for the requirements that must be fulfilled in eminent domain 
proceedings"). 
87. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 
(1897) (citations omitted). 
88. Massachusetts cases recognize two situations in which the validity of an emi­
nent domain taking is subject to legal challenge: "[T]he taking was for an invalid pur­
pose, i.e., not a public one, or ... the taking authority had failed to comply with the 
procedural requirements of [chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws]." Cumber­
land Farms, Inc. v. Montague Econ. Dev. & Indus. Corp., 650 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1995) (citations omitted); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 10 (2000) 
("When the real estate of any person has been taken for the public use ... , but such 
taking, entry or damage was not effected by or in accordance with a formal vote or 
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of Deeds, title to the Site vested in the City and the former owners 
of the Site obtained the vested right to just compensation.89 The 
government's power to take private property and the individual's 
right to receive compensation are inseparable, and are not subject 
to local referendum. Every act of the government or the people is 
subordinate to the Constitution, in which the framers carefully bal­
anced the inherent governmental power of eminent domain with 
the natural right of private property. This unbreakable bond can­
not be changed by local referendum. 
For the cities and towns of the Commonwealth to exist as via­
ble governmental entities, they must possess the necessary power to 
fulfill their responsibilities. For the security of the people, these 
powers must be kept within safe and well-defined limits. The 
United States Supreme Court has pointed out that these limits are 
mandated by the Due Process Clause because: 
[A] legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the prop­
erty of one individual and give it to another individual, would not 
be due process of law, as enjoined by the fourteenth amendment, 
it must be that the requirement of due process of law in that 
amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the state 
to public use, and without compensation, of the private property 
of the citizen. The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure 
to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, 
but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for 
compensation.90 
Due process issues are analyzed in terms of both procedural 
due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process 
requires that state procedures that deprive an individual of life, lib­
erty, or property must be "adequate in light of the affected interest. 
Substantive due process, however, imposes limits on what a state 
may do regardless of what procedural protection is provided. "91 
Procedurally, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due 
process in an eminent domain taking of private property has been 
codified by the legislature in chapter 79 and in the City's Taking 
Law.92 Applying the local referendum law to the City's eminent 
order ... duly authorized by law ... the damages therefor may be recovered under this 
chapter ...."). 
89. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 3 (2000). 
90. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 236-37. 
91. Fournier v. Reardon, 160 F.3d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
92. The Supreme Judicial Court, in discussing due process, has observed that the 
protection afforded property interests by both article 10 of the Massachusetts Declara­
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domain taking of the Site raises serious procedural due process 
concerns. 
The former owners of the Site had a legally vested interest to 
receive just compensation for what was taken from them. A vested 
interest in money is a recognized property right.93 The referendum 
petitions, by initially suspending and, if approved by the voters, in­
validating the City'S taking of the Site, would deprive these individ­
uals of substantial monetary compensation to which they were 
entitled. 
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." We have de­
scribed "the root requirement" of the Due Process Clause as be­
ing "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing 
before he is deprived of any significant property interest."94 
The local referendum law does not provide for notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before a measure is suspended from taking 
effect, reconsidered, and entirely rescinded by the city council, or 
before it is nullified and voided by an election. Application of the 
local referendum law to the City's eminent domain taking of the 
Site would deprive the former owners of the Site of their vested 
property interest in the substantial compensation awarded them by 
the City. Thus, a referendum on the eminent domain taking of the 
Site does not provide sufficient procedural due process to the for­
mer owners. 
Application of the local referendum law to the City's eminent 
domain taking of the Site also violates substantive due process. Al­
though there is no generally accepted or universally applicable defi­
nition of substantive due process, the meaning of that concept and 
its practical import are thoroughly established in our law. The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized the complexities en­
countered in attempting to define the limits of substantive due 
tion of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution "is 
subject to the same analysis." Accordingly, "we shall make no specific distinctions for 
the purposes of our opinion." Opinion of the Justices, 563 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (Mass. 
1990) (citations omitted). 
93. See Hellen v. City of Me'dford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1905) ("[T]he peti­
tioners were entitled, under the Constitution and the statutes then in existence, to have 
their damages paid in money. This was a vested right."). 
94, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citations 
omitted). 
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process.95 
Substantive due process "provides heightened protection 
against government interference with certain fundamental rights 
and liberty interests" including "the specific freedoms protected by 
the Bill of Rights ...."96 The practical significance of this concept 
is that the fundamental rights and interests to which the concept 
attaches receive an elevated form of legal protection, making them 
nearly invulnerable to governmental infringement. A useful meth­
odology to analyze substantive due process issues is the two­
pronged test utilized by the Supreme Court in Washington v. 
Glucksberg:97 
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause 
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which 
are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi­
tion," and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that 
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 
Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a 
"careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. 
Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide 
the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking," that di­
rect and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As 
we stated recently ... the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the 
government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, 
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."98 
A local referendum on the City's eminent domain taking is in­
consistent with the constitutional requirement of substantive due 
process of law. This question of first impression is analyzed in two 
different ways: first, by applying the two-pronged test used by the 
Court in Glucksberg; and second, by applying the traditional legal 
tool which serves as the basis for our common law-finding an ap­
plicable analogy. 
The first prong of the Glucksberg substantive due process test 
requires that an appropriate historical analysis be performed. In 
this case examining the history, legal traditions, and practices of the 
City's taking law, chapter 79, and the local referendum. 
95. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) ('''Due process has 
not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any 
code."') (citations omitted). 
96. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted). 
97. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
98. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted). 
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Eminent domain is an essential, inherent, and unalienable as­
pect of governmental authority. More than a hundred years ago, 
the Supreme Court observed that "[i]n every government there is 
inherent authority to appropriate the property of the citizen for the 
necessities of the State, and constitutional provisions do not confer 
the power, though they generally surround it with safeguards to 
prevent abuse. "99 
The State's inherent power to take property by eminent do­
main is a power that "cannot be contracted or bartered away ... 
[for it] 'must continue unimpaired in the State."'lOO A leading trea­
tise on the law of eminent domain states: 
[The] power of eminent domain does not require recognition by 
constitutional provision, but exists in absolute and unlimited 
form. Because of the concept of the power as an inherent attri­
bute of sovereignty, positive assertion of limitations upon the 
power is required. This requirement is met by the provisions 
found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of 
property by eminent domain. Such constitutional provisions 
neither directly nor impliedly grant the power of eminent do­
main, but are simply limitations upon a power already in exis­
tence which would otherwise be unlimited.lOl 
Among our natural rights as individuals is the right to prop­
erty. In America, an important feature of this natural right is the 
requirement of just compensation when the government takes our 
property. This has been explicitly recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court: 
Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a 
vital principle of republican institutions. "Next in degree to the 
right of personal liberty," Mr. Broom, in his work on Constitu­
tional Law, says, "is that of enjoying private property without un­
99. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240 
(1897). 
100. Town of Chelmsford v. DiBiase, 345 N.E.2d 373, 375-76 (Mass. 1976); see 
also Burnes v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 92 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Mass. 1950); Weeks v. Grace, 
80 N.E.2d 220, 221 (Mass. 1907); Eastern RR v. Boston & Maine RR, 111 Mass. 125, 
130-31 (1872). 
101. 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 1-91 to 
1-92 (rev. 3d ed. 2001); see also id. § 1.4 ("It is now well settled that the provisions of 
the state constitutions are limitations upon an otherwise absolute legislative power and 
not grants of authority to the legislature."); id. § 1.42, at 1-132 ("What distinguishes 
eminent domain from the police power is that the former involves the taking of prop­
erty because of its need for the public use while the latter involves the regulation of 
such property to prevent its use thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public 
interest.") (emphasis added). 
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due interference or molestation." The requirement that the 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa­
tion is but "an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the 
common law for the protection of private property. It is founded 
in natural equity, and is laid down as a principle of universal law. 
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would be­
come worthless if the government possessed an uncontrollable 
power over the private fortune of every citizen. "102 
The City of Springfield has a "Plan A" form of governmenU03 
Chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts General Laws expressly 
authorizes cities with a "Plan A" form of government to take prop­
erty by eminent domain. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu­
setts ("SJC") has pointed out that all cities with standard charters 
are controlled by section 30: 
But it is an express requirement of c. 43, § 30, that any 
purchase or taking of land by the city be "at the request of any 
department." We must read the statute as requiring the request 
of a department as a condition precedent to any purchase or tak­
ing of land. The reason for the requirement may have been that 
the Legislature thought it would be safer if the necessity for a 
particular purchase or taking and the adaptability of the land to 
the proposed use should first become apparent to some depart­
ment iil the course of the performance of its duties, and if the 
department should first decide to make a request. Whatever the 
reason was, the Legislature saw fit to make the requirement, and 
it cannot be ignored. 
The whole purpose of c. 43, § 30, was to place limitations 
upon the purchase or taking of land in order to prevent hasty or 
ill advised action by city councils. The word "department" in this 
section plainly refers to an executive or administrative depart­
ment of the city government . . . . It does not refer to the city 
council itself, even though that body may sometimes in common 
speech be called the legislative department of the city to distin­
guish it from the administrative departments. It was not in­
tended that the city council should request itself to make a 
purchase or taking.104 
102. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 235-36 (citations omitted); 
see also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("Property does not 
have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful depriva­
tion ... is in truth a 'personal' right .... That rights in property are basic civil rights has 
long been recognized."). 
103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000); see also sources cited supra note 56. 
104. Shea v. Inspector of Bldgs., 83 N.E.2d 457, 460-61 (Mass. 1949) (citations 
omitted). 
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Chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws contains "pro­
visions relative to the taking of property by eminent domain and 
the award and recovery of damages for property taken."105 The 
SJC recognized that the "taking of land from a private owner 
against his will for a public use under eminent domain is an exercise 
of one of the highest powers of government. Statutes authorizing 
the exercise of this right must be strictly complied with."106 
The local referendum law establishes a procedure for direct, 
democratic decision-making. Although the general concept of the 
referendum in Massachusetts may date back to Plymouth Col­
ony,107 the right of referendum at the local level was apparently 
nonexistent under state statute until it was adopted in 1915.108 The 
Massachusetts Constitution was amended on November 5, 1918, to 
provide for an initiative and referendum regarding laws passed by 
the General Court. Debates concerning the creation of initiatives 
and referendums took place in July 1917 in the Committee on Initi­
ative and Referendum and provide insight into the general legal 
traditions that may have given rise to the local referendum law. 
Throughout these debates, many of the representatives made re­
marks concerning the purpose and the goals of the resolution pro­
posing to amend the Massachusetts Constitution. For example, Mr. 
Joseph Walker of Brookline remarked that "the initiative and refer­
endum simply gives a method of appeal from the decision of the 
Legislature to the people."109 Mr. Walker further stated that "the 
105. Id. at 458; see also Inhabitants of Watertown v. Dana, 150 N.E. 860, 862 
(Mass. 1926) ("The adoption ... by the general court of G. L. c. 79 ... may be pre­
sumed ... to provide a uniform system of procedure, so that everybody concerned will 
know how to take land by eminent domain .. " Exceptions cannot easily be read into 
such a statute with such a history."). 
106. Lajoie v. City of Lowell, 100 N.E. 1070, 1071 (Mass. 1913); see also Spare v. 
City of Springfield, 120 N.E. 854, 855 (Mass. 1918) (stating that the "taking of property 
by eminent domain is an act strictissimi juris and is valid only when the statutory re­
quirements are performed with exactness"); Laney v. City of Boston, 70 N.E. 88, 89 
(Mass. 1904) ("The general rule of law is that where the Legislature authorizes the 
taking of land for a public use, and the taking is in accordance with the statute, and a 
plain and adequate remedy is provided for compensation, the remedy provided by stat­
ute is exclusive."); Mugar v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 552 N.E.2d 121, 123-24 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1990) ("The taking of private property for a public purpose by eminent do­
main is an inherent attribute of sovereign power. Judicial review is limited to the ques­
tions whether a taking was made for a legitimate public purpose, and whether the 
deprived landowner received just compensation ...." ) (citations omitted). 
107. Statement of Robert Luce of Waltham, in 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHU· 
SETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1917-1918, at 118 (1918) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
108. See Act of May 20, 1915, ch. 267, pI. 1, § 42, 1915 Mass. Acts 302. 
109. DEBATES, supra note 107, at 25. 
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initiative and referendum ... will be a step forward, a long step and 
an effective step, on the part of those who stand for a fairer and a 
squarer deal."110 Dissenters on the Committee on Initiative and 
Referendum were concerned that the very idea of a check on the 
legislature would disrupt, if in fact not destroy, the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of Massachusetts. The dissenting 
members wrote that in their view, the referendum and initiative 
would be subversive to the cornerstones of the United States Con­
stitution including representative government division of public 
powers, guarantee of personal immunities, and judicial protection 
of constitutional guarantees.111 
For purposes of the historical analysis required by the first 
prong of the Glucksberg test, it is significant that the provisions re­
garding initiative and referendum in the Massachusetts Constitu­
tion contain express exclusions.112 The debates concerning these 
exclusions from the initiative and referendum are informative. For 
example, Mr. Merriam remarked: 
[E]ven a sovereign Nation is limited in the exercise of its 
power; ... we all have natural rights which even a sovereign Na­
tion in its sovereignty must recognize. It is stated in the Constitu­
tion that these rights are "natural," that they are "essential," that 
they are "unalienable." Now if that is so there must be a corre­
sponding obligation upon the State to recognize them, otherwise 
they cannot be "rights." ... The protection over property, that it 
cannot be taken "except by due process of law," is an article in 
the Federal Constitution. That phrase in those words is not 
found in the Massachusetts Constitution. That principle still 
would prevail as the law of the land beyond the power of any 
initiative petition to reach it, by virtue of the Federal 
Constitution.113 
The second prong of the Glucksberg test consists of a "careful 
description" of the fundamental and other interests revealed in the 
first prong of the test.114 These interests are then weighed to deter­
mine whether substantive due process attaches to them. If it does, 
they are entitled to receive the elevated legal protection afforded 
110. Id. at 49. 
111. Id. at 14. 
112. See MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48, pt. 2; see also supra note 75 and accompa­
nying text. 
113. DEBATES, supra note 107, at 1000-01. 
114. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
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by the Due Process Clause.1l5 
For purposes of this Article, the central question under the sec­
ond prong of the Glucksberg test is whether the local referendum 
law, as applied to the City's eminent domain taking, violates the 
Constitution's substantive due process protection afforded by 
vested private property rights. The historical analysis previously 
conducted with respect to natural rights, "eminent domain 
power,"116 and the local referendum law reveals the existence of 
two fundamental interests, and a third important, but not funda­
mental interest, which must be clearly identified in order to resolve 
this central question. 
The first fundamental interest is the government's power of 
eminent domain. This governmental power is deeply rooted in this 
nation's history and legal traditions, and applies to the City's emi­
nent domain taking of the Site. The second fundamental interest is 
the individual's right to enjoy private property without undue inter­
ference or molestation. This right of private property is founded in 
natural equity. It is a principle of universal law and it is also deeply 
rooted in this nation's history and legal traditions. A third interest 
is the people's statutory power to nullify or void the final passage of 
any measure unless a majority of the registered voters vote in favor 
thereof. This power was established in the local referendum law 
and, unlike the interests previously discussed, is not deeply rooted 
in this nation's history or legal traditions. Although important, the 
people's statutory power to nullify or void the final passage of a 
local measure is not a fundamental interest protected or guaranteed 
by the Constitution. 
The local referendum law is a state statutory commitment to 
direct democracy that ensures the people a voice in certain types of 
decisions made by city government. The Glucksberg analysis set 
forth above, combined with the traditional analysis discussed below, 
demonstrate that a local referendum on the City's eminent domain 
taking would be inconsistent with our nation's history and legal tra­
ditions as they pertain to the governmental power of eminent do­
main and the natural right of private property. 
The government's power of eminent domain is inherent and 
unalienable. The exercise of this power by the City is constitutional 
115. Id. at 720-2l. 
116. See id. (referring to the separate historical analysis set forth in the first 
Glucksberg prong and applying it to "eminent domain power" with respect to govern­
ment power, the City's Taking Law and chapter 79 of the Massachusetts General Laws). 
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unless used for an illegitimate purpose or in an irrational manner. 
In balancing the government's power of eminent domain with the 
individual's right to property, our Constitution established an un­
breakable bond between taking and compensation. For a long time 
it has been considered unlawful for the government to take private 
property without providing just compensation.117 
The Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment pre­
vent the Massachusetts Legislature, the City Council, and all other 
persons from depriving property owners of their vested rights in 
private property,118 There is no right to a local referendum on an 
eminent domain taking granted in the Constitution or the Bill of 
Rights. It is not one of the activities and decisions that the Supreme 
Court has recognized "as so deeply rooted in our history and tradi­
tions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered 
liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."119 
The judgment of history has confirmed the wisdom of the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other things, these 
great works of American genius guarantee fairness in our laws, lib­
erty in our lives, and security in our private property. These guar­
antees cannot be nullified by a local referendum. The Constitution 
prohibits any state from making or enforcing any law which de­
prives any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law. The Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth and Four­
teenth Amendments thus prohibit state laws that deprive the peo­
ple of their legally protected property interests. 
In addition to the Glucksberg analysis described above, apply­
ing an appropriate legal analogy to the facts presented indicates 
that application of the referendum to eminent domain takings 
would infringe on substantive due process rights. When the City 
recorded the Taking Orders for the Site in the Hampden County 
Registry of Deeds, title vested in the City and gave rise to the City'S 
obligation to pay for the property,120 The legal effect of this vesting 
117. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687, 717 (1999) ("When the government repudiates this duty, either by denying just 
compensation in fact or by refusing to provide procedures through which compensation 
may be sought, it violates the Constitution. In those circumstances the government's 
actions are not only unconstitutional but unlawful and tortious as well."). 
118. See discussion supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
119. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727. 
120. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 3 (2000) ("Upon the recording of an order of 
taking under this section, title to the fee of the property taken ... shall vest in the 
[entity] on behalf of which the taking was made; and the right to damages for such 
taking shall thereupon vest in the persons entitled thereto ...."); see also Grove Hall 
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of title in the City by eminent domain can be understood in relation 
to the law of vested rights: 
A right which has become vested is not dependent upon the com­
mon law or the statute under which it was acquired for its asser­
tion. It has an independent existence. Consequently, the repeal 
of the statute or the abrogation of the common law from which it 
originated does not erase a vested right, but it remains enforce­
able without regard to the repeal. 
In order to become vested, the right must be a ... property 
right, or a right arising from a transaction in the nature of a con­
tract which has become perfected to the degree that it is not de­
pendent on the continued existence of the statute.121 
An order of taking "in writing, duly recorded, in conformity 
with the statute, is to be treated as if it were a statute."122 Treating 
the recorded Taking Orders for the Site as a statute raises the "pre­
sumption against the retroactive application of new laws," which 
is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law 
affords the individual citizen. That presumption "is deeply 
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centu­
ries older than our Republic." This doctrine finds expression in 
several provisions of our Constitution. The specific prohibition 
on ex post facto laws is only one aspect of the broader constitu­
tional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In both the 
civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on 
the sovereign's ability to use its law-making power to modify bar­
gains it has made with its subjects. The basic principle is one that 
protects not only the rich and the powerful, but also the indigent 
defendant engaged in negotiations that may lead to an acknowl­
edgment of guilt and a suitable punishment.123 
Sav. Bank v. Town of Dedham, 187 N.E. 182, 183 (Mass. 1933) ("[U]pon the record of a 
taking under eminent domain title shall vest in the body politic or corporate on behalf 
of which the taking is made and the right to damages shall vest in the persons entitled 
thereto."); Radway v. Selectmen of Dennis, 165 N.E. 410, 411 (Mass. 1929) ("The re­
quirement that the copy of the taking be recorded is not a mere direction, it is the vital 
act upon which depends the transfer of title from the landowner to the municipality. It 
is the operative alienation of the land ... [and] fixes the rights of the parties."). 
121. lA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCIlON § 23.34 
(5th ed. 1992); see also Hellen v. City of Medford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1905) 
("[T]he petitioners were entitled, under the Constitution and the statutes then in exis­
tence, to have their damages paid in money. This was a vested right."). 
122. City of Boston v. Talbot, 91 N.E. 1014,1016 (Mass. 1910) (emphasis added). 
123. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1997) (citations and footnotes omit­
ted); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939,946 (1997) {"[T]here is 
a 'presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurispru­
dence.' The 'principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed 
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Retroactive legislation is legally inappropriate for many 
reasons: 
Perhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation 
is suspect stems from the principle that a person should be able 
to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal conse­
quences. Thus The Federalist stressed the desirability of protect­
ing the people from the "fluctuating policy" of the legislature. 
Closely allied to this factor is man's desire for stability with re­
spect to past transactions .... A substantial basis for the policies 
underlying the hostility to retroactive legislation is evidenced by 
those opinions of the Supreme Court which have held statutes 
violative of the due-process clause on the basis of their retrospec­
tive operation.124 
The effective date of the taking of the Site was September 23, 
1999, the date the Taking Orders were recorded in the Hampden 
County Registry of Deeds. These recorded Taking Orders had the 
effect of a statute. At that time, a vested property interest in the 
amounts awarded by the city council in the Taking Orders accrued 
to the former owners of the Site. In a 1905 case holding unconstitu­
tional a special act abandoning land previously taken by eminent 
domain, the SJC stated: 
At the time [the special act] was enacted, the fee having passed 
to the respondent, the petitioners were entitled, under the Con­
stitution and the statutes then in existence, to have their damages 
paid in money. This was a vested right .... The statute ... did 
not undertake to define the nature of the thing originally taken, 
but to change the right to damages. Before the passage of the 
statute the petitioners were entitled to have their damages as­
sessed and paid in money. This was a substantive right. After 
the statute they were deprived of this right, and were obliged to 
under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal ap­
peal."') (citations omitted). 
124. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retro­
active Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 692-93 (1960); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 
U.S. 498, 547 (1998) ("[F]or centuries our law has harbored a singular distrust of retro­
active statutes.") (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted); Hughes 
Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 947 (,"[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested 
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or 
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must 
be deemed retrospective."') (citations omitted); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 
244, 269-71 (1994) ("The largest category of cases in which we have applied the pre­
sumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contrac­
tual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of prime 
importance.") (footnote omitted). 
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take land instead of money. This was a change not only in the 
remedy, but in the thing that the petitioners were entitled to 
have. It is of no consequence whether the substantive right vests 
by virtue of a provision in the Constitution or in a statute, pro­
vided it is vested. The remedy may be changed, but the right to 
money cannot be changed. As to that, no matter how the remedy 
be changed, the result reached must be, in substance, the same 
. . .. We are of opinion, therefore, that the statute is unconstitu­
tional as applicable to this case.125 
A referendum seeking to invalidate an eminent domain taking 
after title has vested in the City and after the individual's right to 
damages has accrued would unconstitutionally infringe upon rights 
enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A retroactive 
law purporting to change the legal consequences of a closed trans­
action, such as a referendum seeking to undo a taking, would de­
stroy the reasonable certainty and security that are the very objects 
of property ownership. In enacting the local referendum law, the 
legislature could not have intended such a result. 
IV. THE PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENT 
The power of eminent domain is an attribute inherent in sover­
eignty; however, its exercise is constitutionally limited by two inter­
related requirements: (1) the taking must serve a public purpose or 
use126 and (2) just compensation must be paid to the owner for the 
property.127 This trial involved the first requirement for a valid 
governmental taking of private property by eminent domain-a 
public purpose. The controlling issue was whether the public inter­
est was the dominant reason for the taking. 
The concept of public purpose changes with the requirements 
of society and there is no exact legal formula to determine whether 
a taking is for a public purpose. The City's position was that the 
public would actually use and receive benefits from the taking and 
that no private interests would benefit, other than incidentally; 
therefore, the public purpose requirement was met. The Superior 
Court, in ruling that the public purpose was not clear and that the 
City acted in bad faith, invalidated and set aside the takingsP8 
125. Hellen v. City of Medford, 73 N.E. 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1905). 
126. Burnes v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 92 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Mass. 1950). 
127. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV; MASS. CONST. art. 10, pt. 1. 
128. City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., 2000 WL 782971, at *50 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 2000). 
296 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:265 
A. City of Springfield's Position 
Determination of public purpose is primarily a legislative func­
tion. While subject to judicial review, the legislative determination 
is to be given substantial weight. The United States Supreme Court 
has discussed the scope of judicial review of such a determination of 
public purpose under the Fifth Amendment: 
The "public use" requirement is thus coterminous with the scope 
of a sovereign's police powers .... There is, of course, a role for 
courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what con­
stitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is 
equated with the police power. But ... it is "an extremely nar­
row" one .... [D]eference to the legislature's "public use" deter­
mination is required "until it is shown to involve an 
impossibility." ... In short, the Court has made clear that it will 
not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what 
constitutes a public use "unless the use be palpably without reason­
able foundation." ... [W]here the exercise of the eminent do­
main power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, 
the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed 
by the Public Use Clause.129 
The Court further observed: 
[T]he fact that a state legislature, and not the Congress, made the 
public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is 
less appropriate. Judicial deference is required because, in our 
system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what 
public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking 
power. State legislatures are as capable as Congress of making 
such determinations within their respective spheres of authority. 
Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substan­
tial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer 
to its determination that the taking will serve a public use. 130 
A court's role in reviewing the public purpose is extremely nar­
row. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, "[w]hen the legisla­
ture's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our 
cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of tak­
ing-no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socio­
economic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal 
129. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
130. Id. at 244 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted). 
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courts. "131 When a taking occurs for a public purpose, the issue of 
whether the taking of land is necessary or expedient is a legislative 
question, and the determination of the legislature, as a tribunal of 
fact, is conclusive.132 Subject to specific constitutional limitations, 
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been de­
clared conclusively. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, 
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legis­
lation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of 
Columbia or the States legislating concerning local affairs.133 
Massachusetts cases are in accord. In 1899, the SJC discussed 
the scope of review and the line between public and private 
purposes: 
From the nature of the case, there can be no precise line. The 
power requires a degree of elasticity, to be capable of meeting 
new conditions and improvements and the ever-increasing neces­
sities of society. The sole dependence must be on the presumed 
wisdom of the sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of 
gross error or extreme wrong, controlled, by the dispassionate 
judgment of the court.134 
The City's taking of the Site "is entitled to the benefit of a 
presumption that the taking was for a public purpose."135 Neither 
the entire community, nor any significant portion of it, is required 
to directly benefit from or participate in the proposed improve­
ment.136 The City's argument was that the court should not substi­
tute its judgment for the city council's as to what constitutes a 
municipal purpose. To do so would raise the constitutional ques­
tion of whether the judiciary is exercising legislative and executive 
authority prohibited under the separation of powers doctrine.137 
The SJC has described a public use as "one the enjoyment and 
advantage of which are open to the public on equal terms. [Even if] 
only a relatively small portion of the inhabitants may participate in 
131. Id. at 242-43. 
132. City of Boston v. Talbot, 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 (Mass. 1910). 
133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (citation omitted). 
134. Att'y Gen. v. Williams, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (Mass. 1899) (citation omitted). In 
Williams, the SJC said that "while the growing tendency towards an enlargement of the 
field of public expenditures should be jealously watched and carefully held in check, a 
determination of this kind, once made by the legislature, cannot be lightly set aside." 
[d.; see also Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 909 (Mass. 1974) (stating that the role of 
judiciary in reviewing public purpose is "extremely narrow"). 
135. Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 237 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Mass. 1968). 
136. Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Mass. 1937). 
137. MASS. CONST. art. 30, pt. 1. 
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the benefits, ... the use or service must ... [affect] them as a com­
munity and not merely as individuals."138 Public purpose sufficient 
to support a governmental taking of private property by eminent 
domain is an elastic concept that is "being enlarged and extended 
with the progress of the people in education and refinement."139 
Over seventy-five years after Williams was decided, the SIC, in a 
case involving zoning power, wrote: ' 
We live in a changing world where the law must respond to the 
demands of a modern society .... "[W]hile the meaning of con­
stitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application 
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions 
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation." 
What was deemed unreasonable in the past may now be reason­
able due to changing community values. Among these changes is 
the growing notion that towns and cities can and should be aes­
thetically pleasing; that a visually satisfying environment tends to 
contribute to the well-being of its inhabitants.14o Recognizing 
the value of a,beautiful city; the United States Supreme Court ... 
adopted the view that the general welfare embraces aesthetic 
considerations. "The concept of the public welfare is broad and 
inclusive. . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as 
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of 
the legislature to determine that the community should be beau­
tiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as 
well as carefully patrolled."141 
The Supreme Court has recognized the expansive nature of 
public purpose. "Public uses are not limited, in the modern view, to 
matters of mere business necessity and ordinary convenience, but 
may extend to matters of public health, recreation and enjoy­
lllent."142 The New Jersey Supreme Court embraced this approach, 
stating "[t]he concept of public purpose is a broad one .... To be 
serviceable it must expand when necessary to encompass changing 
public needs of a modern dynamic society."143 Likewise in Barnes 
v. City of New Haven,144 the Connecticut Supreme Court noted: 
A public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with vary­
138. Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d at 756. 
139. Williams, 55 N.E. at 78. 
140. John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 
(Mass. 1975) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). 
141. /d. at 717 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954». 
142. Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923). 
143. Roe v. Kervick, 199 A.2d 834, 842 (N.J. 1964). 
144. 98 A.2d 523 (Conn. 1953). 
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ing conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, chang­
ing conceptions of the scope and functions of government, and 
other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in 
population and new modes of communication and transportation. 
Courts as a rule, instead of attempting judicially to define a pub­
lic purpose as distinguished from a private purpose, have left 
each case to be determined on its own peculiar circumstances. 
Promotion of the public safety and general welfare constitutes a 
recognized public purpose. "If the expenditure of public funds 
will promote the welfare of the community, it is for a public pur­
pose." The modern trend of authority is to expand and liberally 
construe the meaning of "public purpose." The test of public use 
is not how the use is furnished but rather the right of the public 
to receive and enjoy its benefit.145 
There is no universal test for distinguishing between public and 
private purposes. 
Each case must be decided with reference to the object 
sought to be \~ccomplished and to· the degree and manner in 
which that object affects the public welfare. Frequently an object 
presents a double aspect in that it may in some respects result in 
conferring a benefit upon the public and in other respects it may 
result in conferring a benefit upon or in paying money to private 
individuals. In such instances the cases tend to distinguish be­
tween those results which are primary and those which are secon­
dary or incidental and to classify the object according to its 
primary consequences and effects. At any rate it is plain that an 
expenditure is not necessarily barred because individuals as such 
may profit, nor is it necessarily valid because of incidental benefit 
to the public.146 
Across the nation courts have faced the issue of public purpose 
in the context of eminent domain takings for mUltipurpose stadiums 
and concluded that stadiums meet the public purpose requirement, 
despite the fact that a professional team might derive some profit 
from use of the stadium.147 In New Jersey Sports & Exposition Au­
145. Id. at 527-28 (citations omitted). 
146. Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Hous. Auth., 23 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Mass. 
1939). 
147. See Ginsberg v. County of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 692 (Colo. 1968) (approv­
ing stadium to be leased to owner of professional football team and minor league base­
ball club); Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628, 699 (Mich. 1972) (holding that 
bonding by county for the purpose of financing construction of a multi-million-dollar 
stadium to be used by a professional baseball team was valid, construction of the sta­
dium did involve a public purpose); Lifteau v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270 
N.W.2d 749, 754-55 (Minn. 1978) (finding that construction of publicly owned stadium 
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thority v. McCrane,148 the court noted that "we are all in agreement 
with the trial court and the numerous authorities cited by it, that it 
is well within the discretion of the Legislature to find that the sports 
and exposition complex ... is a public project and serves a public 
purpose. "149 
In Massachusetts, an advisory Opinion of the Justices 150 to the 
Legislature recognized that a multipurpose stadium may be for a 
public purpose. The Justices wrote: 
We are of opinion [sic] that a large multi-purpose stadium or an 
arena for public activities and events, conventions, professional 
and amateur athletic events, and other large gatherings may be 
for a public purpose if the expenditure of public funds, the exten­
sion of public privileges, powers, and exemptions, and the use, 
rental, and operation of the projects are adequately governed by 
appropriate standards and principles set out in the legislation. 
The Legislature may reasonably determine that there are eco­
nomic, civic, and social advantages to Boston, to eastern Massa­
chusetts, and to the Commonwealth as a whole, from providing in 
the largest city in the State a stadium and an arena l~rge enough to 
attract conventions and similar gatherings and to provide for audi­
ences sufficient to support enterprises of interest to large numbers 
for use by professional baseball and football teams had a public purpose); N.J. Sports & 
Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972) (upholding act creating special 
public entity with eminent domain powers to build a sports complex noting that proper 
public purposes include anything designed to promote the education or recreation of 
the people); Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ohio 1968) (allowing city 
to make expenditures in connection with the construction of a stadium to be leased to a 
major league baseball team); Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606, 608 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1930) (approving city plans to acquire and maintain a multipurpose stadium to be 
financed by an issuance of municipal bonds, for future use of the stadium by a profes­
sional baseball team); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 899 (Pa. 1966) (em­
powering City to secure a loan in the amount of $25 million to build a sports stadium 
and finding that possible use of the stadium by professional athletic teams did not con­
vert the project into a private enterprise so as to render the loan invalid under the 
"public purpose" requirement); Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 
932 P.2d 135, 137 (Wash. 1997) (holding that funding by county to pay pre-construction 
costs of a baseball stadium, prior to the team's agreement to play in stadium, was for 
"public purpose"); Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Wis. 1996) (uphold­
ing public purpose even though the Milwaukee Brewers baseball team would benefit 
from baseball park to be built). 
148. 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972). 
149. Id. at 552. 
150. 250 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1969). Advisory SJC opinions are individuals' opin­
ions, not the court's. "They are not judicial decisions and are not binding upon the 
court as precedents. If the same question arises later ... , the duty of the court is to 
consider it anew, without being affected by the advisory opinion." Bowe v. Sec'y of the 
Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 126 n.2 (Mass. 1946). 
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ofpeople, and suitable to provide recreation and instruction to citi­
zens and others. 151 
The SJC acknowledged that while a multipurpose stadium may not 
be a "traditional" public purpose, such an enterprise "may be found 
to be for public objectives"152 given adequate standards protecting 
the public interest. . 
A review of Massachusetts case law reveals that the City has 
broad authority to take private property for a public purpose. The 
power to take private property for public use may "be exercised by 
the Legislature itself or it may be delegated by statute to the cities 
and towns."153 The legislative authority of the City to take land by 
eminent domain is set forth in chapter 79 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws; in chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts Gen­
eral Laws; and in the City Charter.154 Section 30 provides in perti­
nent part that "[a]t the request of any department, and with the 
approval of the mayor and city council under Plan A ... , the city 
council may, in the name of the city, ... take by eminent domain, 
under chapter 79, any land within its limits for any municipal pur­
pose . ...155 This charter provision has been interpreted to give the 
City "broad power to take land within its limits for any municipal 
purpose."156 The Orders of Taking in the case at bar recite that 
they are made pursuant to chapter 43, section 30 and chapter 79. 
Other cases have addressed the extent of a city's authority 
under general eminent domain statutes. In North Ward Co. v. 
Board of Street Commissioners, 157 the court discussed the scope of 
Boston's authority to take property pursuant to a statute very simi­
lar to chapter 43, section 30 of the Massachusetts General Laws.158 
In North Ward, Boston took property by eminent domain for the 
purpose of providing a location for the disposal of garbage and re­
fuse. At issue, in part, was Boston's power to take property for this 
purpose without explicit legislative authority. Boston had taken the 
property pursuant to chapter 486, section 31 of the 1909 Acts and 
Resolves of Massachusetts,159 which provided that "[a]t the request 
151. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 558 (emphasis added). 
152. [d. at 559. 
153. Burnham v. Mayor of Beverly, 35 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Mass. 1941). 
154. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, §§ 46-55 (2000) (Plan A Charter). 
155. Id. § 30 (emphasis added). 
156. Poremba v. City of Springfield, 238 N.E.2d 43, 47 n.4 (Mass. 1968) (citation 
omitted). 
157. 104 N.E. 965 (Mass. 1914). 
158. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000). 
159. Act of June 11, 1909, ch. 486, § 31, 1909 Mass. Acts 523. 
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of any department, and with the approval of the mayor the board of 
street commissioners, in the name of the city, may take in fee for 
any municipal purpose any land within the limits of the city, not 
already appropriated to public use."160 
In analyzing whether this statute provided Boston with "au­
thority to take land for the erection thereon of a plant for the dispo­
sal of city refuse or garbage," the court opined that the intention of 
the statute was to give Boston the right to take land "for any munic­
ipal purpose" and "to enlarge the power of taking by eminent do­
main so as to make it include every municipal purpose . . . . "161 
Noting that the "collection and disposal of garbage and refuse con­
stitute a legitimate municipal purpose," the court held that Boston 
had the authority to take the property and that no further express 
authority was needed.162 
Similarly, in Burnham v. Mayor of Beverly,163 the court ex­
amined a municipality's powerl64 to take property by eminent do­
main for a municipal airport.165 The Burnham court held that such 
power was not expressly provided in the statutes authorizing the 
expenditure of municipal funds for airports, nor in the statute regu­
lating the airports' maintenance and supervision. Chapter 40, sec­
tion 14 of the Massachusetts General Laws166 supplied such power 
by authorizing Beverly to take property "for any municipal purpose 
for which the purchase or taking of land ... is not otherwise author­
ized or directed by statute. "167 
The broad power of cities to take property by eminent domain 
was reaffirmed in Roberts v. City of Worcester,168 holding that 
Worcester could take property that was part of an Urban Renewal 
Area and had previously been taken by the Worcester Redevelop­
tnpnt A11thorlt'tT 169 111"" I"Ol1-rt nT~thnut 1"Y'\"I'1l"h r11'C""11C"S~""""""" holrl .. h ..... 
.L.L.L_.L.L" .L ......... ".L..I. "''']. ..LL,"" '"' YV.l.L.l.1V .. .l..l.l.U"-'..l.l \..l ':),",U';) J.ViJ, 11"-'lU Lllal
UL Il., 
the defendants had the right to exercise the power of eminent do­
main. The court cited cases standing for the principle that the emi­
nent domain power is inherent in the sovereign and cannot be 
160. [d. 
161. North Ward, 104 N.E. at 966. 
162. [d. 
163. Burnham, 35 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1941). 
164. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2000); see also Shea v. Inspector of Bldgs., 83 
N.E.2d 457, 458-60 (Mass. 1949). 
165. Burnham, 35 N.E.2d at 244-45. 
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2000). 
167. Burnham, 35 N.E.2d at 245. 
168. 625 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1994). 
169. [d. at 1367. 
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di vested.170 
Prior to the specific taking at issue in Springfield, the public 
purpose was recognized legislatively by the September 22, 1999, 
vote of the City Council to accept $4,000,000 in grant awards and to 
authorize the expenditure of such grant funds "for the purposes 
outlined in the grant, including site acquisition, relocation expenses, 
and costs of demolition and development of land in connection with 
the new baseball stadium."171 Further, the Taking Orders reference 
the appropriation, stating that the taking was "for municipal pur­
poses (an appropriation of money having been made for said 
purposes)."l72 
The absence of any detailed legislative recognition of the pub­
lic purpose to be served has been held not to affect the validity of 
the taking. In Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth,173 the plaintiff 
brought suit to recover land which had been taken for a state police 
substation by the Commissioner of Public Safety ("Commis­
sioner"). The statute enabling the Commissioner's action174 au­
thorized the Commissioner to either acquire the Site by purchase or 
to take the land by eminent domain.175 While the Act described the 
locus with particularity, it did "not specify any purpose for the tak­
ing; nor [did] it prescribe any use to which the locus must be put. It 
authorized the Commissioner 'to make such improvements on said 
land as he deems desirable' and to 'expend such sums as may be 
appropriated therefor."'176 The order of taking stated that the pur­
pose was for "maintaining a State Police sub-station."177 The plain­
tiff contended that both the Act and the order of taking were 
invalid: the Act, because it did not mention the public purpose for 
which the land was being taken, and the order of taking, because it 
failed to allege a public purpose. In response to the plaintiff's argu­
ment that the Act was invalid, the court stated: 
This argument is premised upon the assumption that the public 
purpose must be set forth in the enabling act. We disagree. The 
Legislature clearly intended to authorize the taking of the locus. 
t. 
170. Id. at 1366. 
171. Springfield City Council vote dated September 22, 1999. 
172. Notice of Taking, supra note 10. 
173. 237 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 1968). 
174. Act of June 7, 1957, ch. 419, 1957 Mass. Acts 297 (authorizing Commissioner 
of Public Safety to acquire land in Yarmouth). 
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79 (2000). 
176. Caleb Pierce, 237 N.E.2d at 64. 
177. Id. 
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Chapter 419 describes the locus in some detail. The act is enti­
tled to the benefit of a presumption that the taking was for a 
public purpose and was necessary. Accordingly, it is not void on 
its face. 178 
The court held that the order of taking was not invalid for fail­
ure to allege a public purpose, stating "[t]he order states that the 
land was taken for the purpose of 'maintaining a State Police sub­
station.' This is sufficient to withstand the demandant's challenge 
that the order is void on its face."179 Even when the taking order 
simply states that land is taken "for a municipal purpose," the tak­
ing is not rendered invalid.180 
A municipal taking by eminent domain is not invalidated in the 
absence of prior enacted special legislation or a local ordinance set­
ting forth the details of use, operation, and rental of the civic sta­
dium.181 A review of Massachusetts case law indicates that the 
absence of either a special act or local ordinance setting forth the 
details of use, operation, and rental of a project does not invalidate 
the taking. The validity of the taking is an issue separate from the 
use, operation, and rental of condemned property. 
In Sellars v. Town of Concord,182 Concord took property by 
eminent domain for the municipal purposes of building a police and 
fire station and a public meeting hall. At the time of the taking, a 
zoning restriction prohibited the uses for which the town took the 
property. The plaintiff contended that "in the absence of authority 
to construct the proposed municipal buildings at the time of the 
takings the town had no right to take the land."183 The plaintiff also 
argued that due to the zoning restriction, which might never be re­
moved, the taking was not for a public use. The court held the tak­
ing valid, noting that the taking was for a public purpose and that 
the zoning restriction could either be eliminated with the permis­
178. Id. at 65. 
179. Id. " 
180. Byfield v. City of Newton, 141 N.E. 658, 663 (Mass. 1923); see also Bouchard 
v. City of Haverhill, 171 N.E.2d 848, 849 (Mass. 1961) (failing to recite the specific 
purpose in order of taking does not render the vote void; amendment could be made). 
181. Opinion of the Justices, 350 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1969) (discussing public pur­
pose with regard to proposed legislation involving a stadium to be constructed and op­
erated by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, which did not consider the issue of 
whether such legislation must precede the exercise of eminent domain power by a mu­
nicipality in furtherance of a given project). 
182. 107 N.E.2d 784 (Mass. 1952). 
183. Id. at 785. 
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sion of the board of appeals or amended.184 Since the town's good 
faith was not at issue, the court assumed that the proposed uses 
were not pretenses and that the town officials would "diligently 
proceed to do whatever is necessary to effectuate the objects for 
which the land was taken."185 With regard to the uncertainty of the 
project at the time of the taking, the court stated: 
That a possibility exists that the land may not be devoted to the 
proposed uses cannot be denied. But in the absence of evidence 
that the town cannot reasonably expect to achieve its public pur­
poses, we cannot deny its right to take land by eminent domain. 
Obviously in the carrying out of the projects contemplated by the 
town many steps must be taken, and they cannot all be taken at 
once. It would be unreasonable to hold that the town could not 
exercise the power of eminent domain until all steps necessary to 
the carrying out of the projects had been taken.186 
The decision in Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth 187 further indi­
cates that a lack of legislation detailing the use, operation, and 
rental of property prior to the taking does not invalidate the taking. 
In Ballantine, the town voted to appropriate funds to take private 
property for public parking and to authorize the board of selectmen 
to negotiate and enter into a lease for a private entity to operate the 
parking facility.188 The taking was pursuant to chapter 40, section 
14 of the Massachusetts General Laws.189 There were no detailed 
statutory provisions for lease of the property. The court of appeals 
held that the taking was valid and the SJC affirmed.190 
The SJC has raised concerns that the public purpose of a civic 
stadium requires that "the use, rental, and operation of the project" 
are adequately governed by appropriate standards and principles 
set out in the legislation.191 In the present case, the City proposed 
to retain ownership of the land as well as ultimate control over its 
use through the terms of the ground lease. The ground lease would 
had to have been approved by the city council.192 Once approved, 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 786. 
187. 294 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973), affd in part, rev'd in part, 298 N.E.2d 
695 (Mass. 1973). 
188. Id. at 527. 
189. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2000). 
190. Ballantine, 298 N.E.2d at 700. 
191. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969). 
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 3 (2000); see also Gould v. City Council, 465 
N.E.2d 258, 260 (Mass. 1984) (noting that city council approval of the lease, or city 
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that lease would become the "legislation" for "use, rental and oper­
ation" of the civic stadium. 
To the extent that the details of stadium availability for civic 
uses other than professional baseball were an issue, the City argued 
that the ground lease provisions could provide adequate standards 
and controls to satisfy the concerns expressed in Opinion of the Jus­
tices .193 Furthermore, in light of its status as a municipal corpora­
tion with home rule authority, the City stands in a distinctly 
different position than the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority in 
Opinion of the Justices .194 
Home rule is a legal concept guaranteeing local autonomy in 
local matters. A leading authority on municipal law observes that 
home rule has evolved in response to legislative interference in lo­
cal affairs and was designed to free municipalities from legislative 
rule. 
The purpose was to give local communities full power in matters 
of local concern, which were to be regarded as exclusive matters 
of local self-government or home rule. With the growing size of 
municipalities and the increased scope of state legislation there 
were at least two other reasons for providing the creation of local 
governmental units to handle local problems: (1) to relieve the 
legislature from the burden of dealing with local affairs ... , and 
(2) the realization that local problems required more attention 
and comprehensive knowledge than the state could exercise.195 
In Massachusetts, home rule is constitutionally established and 
statutorily governed. The constitutional basis for home rule is the 
"Home Rule Amendment,"196 while the statutory basis is the 
"Home Rule Procedures ACt."197 The right of local self-govern­
ment or "home rule" is a significant legal milestone in the histOiY of 
the commonwealth. Before home rule was established in 1966: 
[T]he regulation of the affairs of the cities and towns of the Com­
monwealth was vested primarily in the General Court. In order 
for a municipality to react to the needs of its citizens, it would 
have to seek specific enabling legislation from the legislature. 
council approval of special legislation to facilitate the lease, would likely be subject to 
local referendum). 
193. 250 N.E. at 558. 
194. See id. 
195. EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.40, at 51 
(3d ed. rev. 1999). 
196. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, §§ 1-9; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 7 (2000). 
197. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, §§ 1-20 (2000). 
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The increasing demands upon local government, together with 
the time-consuming method of reacting to these demands, led to 
the passage of Article 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution, 
which established the basic right of municipalities to self-govern­
ment. The Horne Rule Procedures Act (HRPA), in turn, was 
passed to detail the procedures under which the municipalities 
could effect this constitutional grant of home rule ... .1 98 
Fifteen years later, another commentator noted: 
The Home Rule Amendment ... ("HRA") ... fundamentally 
altered the structure of government in Massachusetts. Prior to its 
enactment, Massachusetts' municipalities were considered hierar­
chical subordinates to the state legislature that could only enact 
local legislation after receiving an affirmative grant of power. In 
contrast, the HRA allows municipalities to act until the General 
Court specifically prohibits or confines their lawmaking.199 
Home rule authorization for the City's taking of the Site was 
not necessary since a state statute200 expressly conferred eminent 
domain taking power upon the City. Whenever orders "are neces­
sary ... [actions] may be taken by ordinance ... resolution, order or 
vote . . . . Any requirement that an ordinance ... be entitled as 
such, or that it contain the word "ordained," "enacted" or words of 
similar import shall not affect the validity of any action ... to be 
taken by ordinance ...."201 According to the court in Oleksak v. 
City of Westfield,202 "[a]n ordinance is a legislative enactment of a 
city effective only within its own boundaries, and no return to any 
State authority is required after its enactment."203 In an earlier 
case, the court noted that "[t]here may be occasions where a Legis­
lature uses the word 'ordinance' as referring to any legislative ac­
tion of a city council as opposed to action purely executive."204 
Massachusetts law defines an ordinance as "a vote or order of the 
city council entitled 'ordinance' and designed for the permanent 
regulation of any matter within the jurisdiction of the city council as 
198. John W. Lemega, State and Municipal Government: Home Rule, 14 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. L. 264, 264 (1967). 
199. Joanna Blum Jerison, Home Rule in Massachusetts, 67 MASS. L. REV. 51, 51­
52 (1982)(footnotes omitted). 
200. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000). 
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 13 (2000). 
202. 172 N.E.2d 85 (Mass. 1961). 
203. Id. at 87. 
204. Brucato v. City of Lawrence, 156 N.E.2d 676, 681 (Mass. 1959) (citation 
omitted). 
308 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:265 
laid down in this chapter. "205 
The City's vote to take the Site by eminent domain is to be 
treated as a type of local legislation. "The act ... in the form of a 
taking in writing, duly recorded, in conformity with the statute, is to 
be treated as if it were a statute."206 This type of local legislation is 
within the constitutional right of local self-government.207 It must 
therefore be upheld because it is not "inconsistent" with state laws 
or the Constitution.208 The court in Connors v. City of Boston209 
further noted that: 
Massachusetts has the "strongest type of home rule," and munici­
pal action is presumed to be valid. The analysis whether local 
action is inconsistent with a State statute is analogous to the anal­
ysis whether Federal law preempts State action; the touchstone 
of the analysis is whether the State Legislature intended to pre­
empt the city's authority to act.210 
In the case at bar there is no "express legislative intent to for­
bid" the City's eminent domain taking of the Site.211 Since the 
City's eminent domain taking power is expressly authorized by 
state statute, it does not "frustrate the purpose of the statute so as 
to warrant an inference that the Legislature intended to preempt 
the subject. "212 As well, no factual or legal basis exists to "infer 
that the Legislature intended to preempt the field" of eminent do­
main to the exclusion of local government.213 There is no conflict 
between the City's taking of the Site and the statutory power of 
eminent domain. The Massachusetts Legislature has neither pre­
empted nor prohibited the City's legislative determination as to the 
public purpose of the proposed civic stadium. Consequently, the 
City's taking of the Site should be upheld as a valid exercise of the 
right of self-government in local matters. 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that subsequent to 
205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 1 (2000). 
206. City of Boston v. Talbot, 91 N.E. 1014, 1016 (Mass. 1910). 
207. "It is the intention of this article to reaffirm the customary and traditional 
liberties of the people with respect to the conduct of their local government, and to 
grant and confirm to the people of every city and town the right of self-government in 
local matters .... " MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, § 1. 
208. Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1999). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. (citations omitted). 
211. Id. (quoting Boston Gas Co. v. Somerville, 652 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Mass. 
1995». 
212. Id. at 338. 
213. Id. 
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relocation, demolition, and site preparation, the City planned to 
enter into a ground lease for the property with a non-profit entity­
the Springfield Baseball Corporation ("SBC"), which owned a 
baseball franchise.214 At the trial, the defendants claimed that the 
uncertainty of the arrangement negated the public purpose because 
it was possible that final lease terms might never be negotiated. In 
addressing the same issue, the court in Court Street Parking Co. v. 
City of Boston215 held: 
The possibility that some lot or lots will continue indefinitely 
without the construction of a building thereon could have been 
provided against either by requiring that the city itself build after 
a period of attempted leasing or, as the plaintiffs have suggested, 
by authorizing a taking only after a lease to construct had been 
secured. But it is not necessary so to limit and hamper the city in 
its acquisition and development of property for a public purpose. 
We hold that such aspects of private advantage as the statu­
tory plan presents are reasonably incidental to carrying out a 
public purpose in a way which is within the discretion of the Leg­
islature to choose.216 
Similarly, the SJC in Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth 217 re­
versed the appeals court holding disapproving of a plan to lease 
land taken for "municipal purposes" to a third party. The appeals 
court had held that although a taking of property was valid, the 
town had "no authority to lease property which it had just acquired 
by eminent domain for parking purposes because land so acquired 
for off street parking facilities had to be 'held, used and operated by 
the town itself."'218 The SJC reversed, holding instead that while it 
agreed that the taking was valid standing alone, the town had the 
power to lease the property despite the uncertainty as to whether or 
not a lease could ever be negotiated and the uncertainty over the 
214. Unless an exemption was obtained, award of the ground lease would be sub­
ject to the requirements of the Uniform Procurement Act. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
30B (2000). Such exemption was obtained with regard to earlier proposal at the Chico­
pee River Technology Park where the city owned land. See Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 43, 
1995 Mass. Acts 606 ("An Act exempting the leasing of certain land in the city of 
Springfield from certain bidding laws"); Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 44, 1995 Mass. Acts 
607 ("An Act authorizing the city of Springfield to lease certain property"). 
215. 143 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. 1957). 
216. Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 
217. 298 N.E.2d 695 (Mass. 1973). 
218. Id. at 697 (quoting Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth, 294 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1973)). 
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substance of its final terms.219 The court found that the public pur­
pose for the taking could be carried out whether the town or a pri­
vate lessee operated the parking lot and that the public purpose is 
not invalidated because some private benefit may ensue.220 
The "town has authority to lease the premises for use by some­
one else upon condition satisfactory to the selectmen, provided that 
the premises will be used for a purpose for which the town took 
them."221 The court concluded that a lease arrangement by which a 
private individual may operate a premises acquired for municipal 
parking purposes is embraced within the language of the statutes.222 
These statutes authorize a town to make such orders as it may deem 
necessary or expedient for disposal or use of its corporate property 
and to make contracts for exercise of its corporate powers.223 
"We believe that the power of a town to authorize its 
selectmen to enter into an arrangement by which others may oper­
ate premises acquired for municipal parking purposes is 'conferred 
by statute or necessarily implied' from the statutory powers ex­
pressly granted to towns. "224 
At trial, the City argued that the facts regarding the civic sta­
dium were substantially similar to Ballantine225 and Court Street 
Parking.226 The City Council's vote to take the Site was not contin­
gent upon the negotiation of any lease, nor had a final lease been 
negotiated. Furthermore, the City would continue to own the land 
for the purpose for which it was taken. It intended to lease the land 
to a non-profit entity which would construct and operate a civic sta­
dium. Presumably, such lease would have been negotiated on terms 
satisfactory to the mayor and the City Council.227 That the lease 
219. The court upheld the taking, noting that "[t]he authorization to take the 
premises was not contingent upon the negotiation of a lease with the Authority or any­
one else." Id. at 699. Significant in the court's conclusion was the fact that "the prem­
ises will in all events be owned by the town and used for the public purpose for which 




223. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 3 (2000) ("A town ... may make such orders 
as it may deem necessary or expedient for the disposal or use of its corporate prop­
erty."); Id. § 4 (2000) (permitting a town to "make contracts for the exercise of its cor­
porate powers"). 
224. Ballantine, 298 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting Atherton v. Selectman of Bourne, 149 
N.E.2d 232, 235 (Mass. 1958». 
225. Id. 
226. 143 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. 1957). 
227. When and if a lease is negotiated, and assuming it is for a period of more 
than three years, it will be subject to approval by the city council. See MASS. GEN. 
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had not yet been negotiated should not invalidate the taking. As in 
Ballantine and Court Street Parking, the City would own the land at 
all times and use of the premises would have been restricted to the 
public purpose for which the premises were acquired.228 
The proposed leasing of the land for the new civic stadium pro­
ject was evidence of an arrangement that would further the public 
purpose. The draft ground lease required the lessee to construct 
the civic stadium at "its sole cost," and lessor was prohibited from 
using the premises for "any other purpose."229 The evidence was 
undisputed that the Site was taken for a civic stadium and was in­
tended by city officials to be used as such. 
The public purpose would also be furthered under the pro­
posed term in which the City would have the right to use the sta­
dium rent-free for athletic events and other civic purposes subject 
to the lessee's prior right to use the stadium. The baseball team 
would play forty to fifty games per year in the stadium. As such, 
the stadium would be available on numerous other dates for other 
civic purposes including non-professional sports events, such as col­
lege, high school, and amateur baseball or softball games, concerts, 
and educational and recreational events. Any concerns that "the 
use, rental, and operation of the project"· be adequately governed 
by appropriate standards and principles could have been addressed 
in a final ground lease. If satisfactory lease terms could not have 
been negotiated, as in Ballantine and Court Street Parking, the City 
would have retained ultimate control of the land. 
To the extent that the details of stadium availability to non­
professional baseball and other civic uses were an issue, ground 
lease provisions could have provided adequate standards and con­
trols to satisfy the concerns expressed in Opinion of the Justices .230 
Unlike the Turnpike Authority in that opinion, the City was exper­
ienced in the operation and leasing of similar facilities, such as the 
Springfield Civic Center and Symphony Hall. Also, the City has a 
LAWS ch. 40, § 3 (2000); see also Act of June 23, 1995, ch. 43, 1995 Mass. Acts 606 
(exempting the leasing of certain land in the City of Springfield from some bidding 
laws); Act of June 23,1995, ch. 44, 1995 Mass. Acts 607 (authorizing the City of Spring­
field to lease certain property). 
228. See McLean v. City of Boston, 97 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Mass. 1951) (noting that 
an arrangement to take land by eminent domain with intent to turn the property over to 
a private party does not destroy the public purpose of the taking if it is "in furtherance 
of a public purpose"). 
229. Draft of Ground Lease between City of Springfield and Lessee (on file with 
author). 
230. 250 N.E.2d 547, 558-61 (Mass. 1969). 
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legislative branch of government in its city council which is empow­
ered to control budget expenses and make land use decisions. 
Under the draft ground lease, the City would not have been 
responsible for the debt incurred in the actual construction cost of 
the stadium, estimated in the range of $15,000,000. The lessee 
would have been responsible for all expenses related to develop­
ment, construction, and operation of the stadium, including utilities, 
insurance, maintenance, repairs, and replacements. At the termina­
tion of the lease, however, title to the stadium would have vested in 
the City. 
Another factor distinguishing the proposed civic stadium from 
the arrangement considered in the Opinion of the lustices231 is. the 
non-profit status of the proposed tenant. As the evidence. indi­
cated, the City contemplated executing a ground lease with the 
non-profit SBC. This non-profit entity would construct a civic sta­
dium for use by professional baseball and other civic purposes. 
SBC's status as a non-profit corporation qualified it for a tax ex­
emption as a public charity pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the In­
ternal Revenue Code,232 This status would facilitate private 
financing through tax-exempt bonds as well as private donations. 
Such status is significant in light of the SIC recognition in 
Helmes v. Commonwealth233 that the public expenditure of 
$6,000,000 to repair the battleship U .S.S. Massachusetts, paid to a 
charitable corporation, was not in violation of the "anti-aid" 
amendment.234 As noted by the court, the public funds did not ben­
efit the private corporation beyond enabling it to carry out its es­
sential purpose.235 
SBC's articles of organization and by-laws set forth its pur­
poses as including (a) lessening the burdens on the City in its efforts 
to rehabilitate the downtown area; (b) promoting redevelopment of 
and stopping community deterioration in downtown Springfield; (c) 
supporting tourism and economic development; (d) establishing 
baseball and softball for inner-city public school students in the 
Springfield area by providing organizational support for this pur­
pose; (e) expanding employment opportunities and increasing the 
general level of personal income in downtown Springfield; and (f) 
231. Id. 
232. 1.R.c. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
233. 550 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1990). 
234. Id. at 874. See generally MASS. CONST. art. 18, amended by MASS. CONST. 
amends. 46, 103. 
235. Helmes, 550 N.E.2d at 874. 
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promoting the common good and general welfare of the City and its 
residents. 
As in Helmes, the purposes of the corporation limit the expen­
diture of the public funds to the designated uses which lead to a 
determination by the Internal Revenue Service that the entity was a 
"public charity."236 Furthermore, like Helmes, the articles of or­
ganization provide that upon dissolution of the corporation, the as­
sets of the corporation must be distributed to another charitable 
corporation or to the City of Springfield.237 
Also, similar to Helmes, no private person would be likely to 
benefit specially from the expenditure. Under the by-laws of the 
SBC, the board of directors would serve without compensation. 
The board's composition was subject to restrictions aimed at insur­
ing that control of the board would continue with civic-minded 
community leaders and be operated for the benefit of the 
community. 
Unlike the proposal in Opinion of the Justices,238 where the 
Turnpike Authority was planning to lease the stadium to a for-profit 
professional athletic team, the non-profit SBC was the owner of a 
Northern League baseball franchise239 intending to play in the sta­
dium. By acting in furtherance of the corporation's purpose set 
forth in its articles of organization and by-laws, there was no private 
inurement or benefit that would result from the corporation's activ­
ities except for the incidental benefits resulting from the economic 
development, that would be created. The financing for the new 
civic stadium project was a creative collaboration between the pub­
lic and private sectors and would have resulted in a new state-of­
the-art civic stadium being constructed with only a fraction of its 
total cost being paid by the taxpayers. 
SBC obtained commitments of approximately $15,000,000 to 
finance construction of the new civic stadium. Questions were 
raised by the defendants over the uncertainty of whether those pri­
vate financing commitments would be available. In a case where 
similar public-private cooperation involving a taking in Boston was 
being challenged, the court said: 
It cannot be known in advance when private capital for this pur­
236. Id. at 873. 
237. Id. at 875. 
238. 563 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1990). 
239. Mr. Graney testified that the Northern League is an independent baseball 
league, which means that it is not affiliated with Major League Baseball or its teams. 
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pose will surely be available .... The possibility that some lot or 
lots will continue indefinitely without the construction of a build­
ing thereon could have been provided against either by requiring 
that the city itself build after a period of attempted leasing or, as 
the plaintiffs have suggested, by authorizing a taking only after a 
lease to construct had been secured. But it is not necessary so to 
limit and hamper the city in its acquisition and development of 
property for a public p·urpose.240 
The same reasoning is applicable to the present case. The questions 
raised as to the private financing do not affect the public purpose 
here. 
The public sector's total financial participation in the new civic 
stadium was to be $6,000,000. One-third of this public money was 
going to be derived from a $2,000,000 general obligation bond ap­
proved and appropriated by the City Council in May 1995. The 
remaining two-thirds of the public money was to come from a 
$2,000,000 Public Works Economic Development Grant 
("PWED")241 grant and a $2,000,000 Community Development Ac­
tion Grant ("CDAG").242 
The City applied for a PWED grant from the Commonwealth's 
Executive Office of Transportation and Construction ("EOTC"). 
On September 10, 1999, a PWED grant in the amount of $2,000,000 
was awarded to the City of Springfield by the EOTC for the civic 
stadium project. The statutory source for the PWED grant derives 
from chapter 732 of the Acts of 1981, entitled "An Act Providing 
for a Transportation Development and Improvement Program for 
the Commonwealth."243 Specifically, section 17(c) of the Act pro­
vides that the purpose of the funds are for "any public works facili­
ties deemed necessary for economic development by the secretary 
of transportation upon petition of an appropriate local executive 
government body."244 
Title 701, section 5.04 of the Massachusetts Code states: 
Eligible projects shall include but will not necessarily be limited 
to projects for the design, construction and/or reconstruction of 
existing and/or newly located public access roads, streets and 
bridges, curbing sidewalks, lighting systems, traffic control and 
240. Court St. Parking Co. v. City of Boston, 143 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Mass. 1957). 
241. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 701, §§ 5.00-5.10 (1993). 
242. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B, § 57A (2000) (providing statutory authority for 
the CDAG grant); see also id. § 1 (definitions). 
243. Act of Dec. 24, 1981, ch. 732, § 17C, 1981 Mass Acts 1131. 
244. Id. 
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service facilities drainage systems and culverts associated with a 
municipal economic development effort which seeks to or will: 
(a) retain establish, expand or otherwise revitalize industrial or 
commercial plants or facilities; 
(b) create or retain long-term employment opportunities; 
(c) have a positive impact on the local tax base; 
(d) leverage high ration private investment, and; 
(e) strengthen the partnership between public and private sec­
tors.245 
As previously noted, the Secretary approved the civic stadium as 
eligible. 
The City applied for a CDAG from the Commonwealth's De­
partment of Housing and Community Development ("DHCD") 
and received an award letter. On September 20,1999, DHCD noti­
fied the City that it was "preparing a contract" for a "$2 million 
grant" regarding "the Marox site of 2.44 acres" which "is decadent 
and eligible for funding for site acquisition, and/or clearance, and/or 
preparation."246 Under section 57 A of the MassaGhusetts General 
Laws, 
[a]ny eligible city or town, acting by and through its municipal 
officers or by and through any agency designated by such munici­
pal officers to act on their behalf, including but not limited to its 
urban renewal agency, may apply to the department for a grant 
in a specific amount to fund a specified community development 
project. Said grants shall be in addition to the assistance other­
wise made available under this chapter and to other forms of lo­
cal, state and federal assistance.247 
Criteria for approval of the grants requires a finding by DHCD 
that "[t]he project will be ofpublic benefit, in the public interest 
and for a public purpose, consistent with the sound needs of the 
community as a whole, and any benefit to private entities or indi­
viduals will be indirect and incidental and not the purpose of the 
proj ect. "248 
The public benefits flowing from the new civic stadium project 
also support a finding of public purpose. In this case, the public 
purpose for the City's eminent domain taking of the Site-a new 
civic stadium-promotes the general welfare of the City's inhabi­
245. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 701, § 5.04 (1993). 
246. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B, § 57A (2000); see also id. § 1 (definitions). 
247. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B, § 57A(a) (2000). 
248. Id. § 57A(b)(2). 
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tants by providing civic, recreational, and economic benefits. The 
civic stadium project received significant financial support from the 
commonwealth,249 which provided two-thirds of the project's total 
public funding. The Commonwealth's financial support for the 
civic stadium is a tangible form of state recognition of the project's 
public purpose. 
The City Planning Department conducted an examination of 
potential downtown locations for the new minor league baseball 
stadium. One of the locations identified as a potential site for the 
new stadium was the Chicopee River Business Park. Although the 
Chicopee River location was attractive from the standpoint of "land 
acquisition cost, parking and accessibility," it did not provide many 
"economic spin-offs" because: 
It is not likely that downtown business, even the hotels, would 
realize an increase in business as a result of professional baseball. 
Rather, economic spin-offs for Springfield are limited to supplier 
relationships and employment. 
With this in mind, it is appropriate to look at downtown 
sites. Indeed the success of downtown ballparks in Cleveland, 
Buffalo and Harrisburg, requires a further study of Springfield's 
downtown. Two sites, Main-Congress and Carew-Bond-Patton, 
come to mind ....250 
After describing the properties contained in the Main-Con­
gress site, the Planning Department pointed out that the Site of­
fered "a blend of downtown/urban opportunities" and "a wide 
latitude of spin-off attractions."251 Mayor Albano related how the 
location for the new civic stadium was an important part of his ad­
ministration's downtown revitalization strategy and would have a 
significant impact on the quality of life in the region: 
Sports and recreation have a unique significance for Springfield 
249. The Commonwealth's financial support for the City's civic stadium project 
followed a grant application process during which state officials carefully scrutinized the 
project. They questioned the City on a number of matters. The City promptly re­
sponded with· answers to the Commonwealth's questions. This occurred before the 
state funds (PWED and CDAG) were awarded to the City. Springfield v. Dreison 
Invs., Inc., Civ. A, No. 99-1318, 2000 WL 782971, at *25 (Mass. Super. Feb. 25, 2000). 
250. Minor League Baseball Stadium, Potential Downtown Location, Springfield 
Planning Department 001676 (June 1996). The Planning Department found that Inter­
state 291 "is a physical barrier separating the site from the downtown area. This may 
hurt the potential for spin-off development." In addition, the Planning Department 
estimated the development costs of the Carew-Bond-Patton site to be higher than the 
development costs of the Main-Congress site. Dreison Invs., 2000 WL 782971, at *7-8. 
251. Springfield Planning Department, supra note 250. 
317 2002] CASE STUDY OF A TAKING UNDONE 
which is the birthplace of basketball. A new civic stadium in 
Springfield will promote the City's general welfare by improving 
the quality of life for City residents while bolstering the City's 
image as an entertainment and tourist center. These things will 
make a significant and positive contribution to the continuing vi­
tality of Springfield.2s2 
In support of a public purpose, the City argued that the loca­
tion for the new civic stadium was an important part of a downtown 
revitalization strategy. The new civic stadium would complement 
other projects, such as the new Basketball Hall of Fame and the 
Convention Center. Siting the new civic stadium where proposed 
would further Springfield's goal of improving its downtown as a 
sports and entertainment destination by bolstering the City's image 
as a tourist center. The civic stadium site was carefully selected to 
increase social and economic activity in the downtown area during 
crucial evening and weekend hours. 
Adding baseball to the City's mix of attractions would improve 
the quality of life in Springfield and bring the community together. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Musmanno of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania eloquently identified the benefits of a baseball 
stadium: 
We are not dealing with the horse and buggy age, but with the 
atomic age. But, more than that, we are dealing with a modern 
development in an age which properly regards as essentials for all 
the people services which heretofore were enjoyed only by the 
wealthy and the affluent. There is need today to provide the 
public with facilities for recreation, sports and enjoyment of out­
door athletic competition. Even passive participation as an on­
looker in competitive sports stimulates a desire for physical 
exercise. In any event it takes the spectator into the open air and 
provides him with exuberant escape from the cares of the day 
and arms him with recharged energy to meet responsibilities as a 
citizen. All this helps to build up a healthy community .... 
The objective of a community is not merely to survive, but to 
progress, to go forward into an ever-increasing enjoyment of the 
blessings conferred by the rich resources of this nation under the 
benefaction of the Supreme Being for the benefit of all the peo­
ple of that community. 
If a well governed city were to confine its governmental 
252. Aff. of Mayor Michael J. Albano 2, at 'II 4 (on file with City'S Comprehensive 
Statement of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Civ. A, No. 99-1318, Hampden County Super. 
Ct.). 
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functions merely to the task of assuring survival, if it were to do 
nothing but provide "basic services" for an animal survival, it 
would be a city without parks, swimming pools, zoo, baseball 
diamonds, football gridirons and playgrounds for children. Such 
a city would be a dreary city indeed. As man cannot live by 
bread alone, a city cannot endure on cement, asphalt and sewer 
pipes alone. A city must nave a municipal spirit beyond its physi­
cal properties, it must be alive with an esprit de corps, its person­
ality must be such that visitors-both business and tourist-are 
attracted to the city, pleased by it and wish to return to it. That 
personality must be one to which the population contributes by 
mass participation in activities identified with that city. 
Hardly anything in America symbolizes a large city more 
than its ... baseball team. To take the ... baseball team out ... 
would be to deprive ... people of the opportunity for a spontane­
ous outburst of civic pride, for which there is no substitute .... 
. . . Not to have the gladsome and thrilling Opening Day of 
the Baseball Season each spring, not to watch the tension­
charged race of the home team against the teams from afar . . . 
would be tragedy indeed ....253 
A new civic stadium would also bring intangible benefits to the 
City. For example, it would enhance the image of downtown, 
strengthen the community, and help promote the City's livability. 
It would make people optimistic about downtown's future, as well 
as provide an additional place for public gatherings. Having minor 
league baseball in the City would cause Springfield's name to be 
repeated throughout the Northeast in the sports pages and elec­
tronic media. A stadium would bring more people downtown. It 
would provide a needed opportunity for an affordable family out­
ing, generate civic pride, cause greater utilization of the City's ex­
isting business base, and further the City's efforts to become a 
major attraction for visitors and businesses. These civic benefits, 
which would be derived from the taking of the Site, supported up­
holding the taking as in the public's interest. "The concept of the 
public welfare is . .. spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine 
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious 
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."254 
The City also argued, in support of a public purpose, that rec­
253. Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 218 A.2d 906, 913-14 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J., 
concurring). 
254. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted). 
319 2002] CASE STUDY OF A TAKING UNDONE 
reation itself is a public purpose and includes spectator sports. In 
discussing the meaning of recreation with in the context of the Mas­
sachusetts General Laws,255 the Massachusetts Court of Appeals 
stated: 
"Recreation" in its most natural signification means "refresh­
ment of strength and spirits after work; ... a means of refresh­
ment or diversion." This would include not only the active 
pursuits (playing baseball and the like) to which the plaintiffs 
would apparently confine its meaning but also passive pursuits, 
such as watching baseball, strolling in the park to see animals, 
flowers, the landscape architecture, or other sights, picnicking, 
and so forth ....256 
Recreation has traditionally been recognized by the courts 
across the United States as a public purpose. In 1923, the U.S. Su­
preme Court specifically stated that "[p ]ublic uses are not limited, 
in the modern view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordi­
nary convenience, but may extend to matters of public health, recre­
ation and enjoyment."257 
In Massachusetts, activities which promote recreation of the 
public constitute a public purpose. For example, the SJC, referring 
to a statute authorizing the raising of money by taxation for the 
erection of a memorial hall, stated: 
[A] statute ... may be vindicated on the same grounds as statutes 
authorizing the raising of money for monuments, statues, gates, 
or archways, celebrations, the publication of town histories, 
parks, roads leading to points of fine natural scenery, decorations 
upon public buildings, or other public ornaments or embellish­
ments designed merely to promote the general welfare, either by 
providing for fresh air or recreation, or by educating the public 
taste, or by inspiring sentiments of patriotism, or of respect for 
255. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 17C (2000). 
256. Catanzarite v. City of Springfield, 592 N.E.2d 752, 752-53 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1992). A number of state statutes recognize recreation as a legitimate public purpose. 
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 44, § 7(25) (2000) (authorizing the City to incur debt for "the 
construction of municipal outdoor recreational and athletic facilities, including the ac­
quisition and development of land and the construction and reconstruction of facili­
ties"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 45, § 14 (2000) (recognizing recreation as a suitable public 
purpose for which cities may acquire land and buildings by eminent domain for pur­
poses of a public playground or recreation center); Act of June 3, 1968, ch. 377, 1968 
Mass. Acts 225 (creating the Springfield Civic Center Commission and declaring that 
the establishment of structures to "accommodate large public and private gatherings, 
banquets, trade shows, the performing arts, concerts, sports events and cultural events" 
is "proper public or municipal purpose"). 
257. Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (emphasis added). 
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the memory of worthy individuals. The reasonable use of public 
money for such purposes has been sanctioned by several differ­
ent statutes, and the constitutional right of the legislature to pass 
such statutes rests on sound principles.258 
This principle is firmly established in other jurisdictions as well.259 
Upholding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing Boston 
to borrow money outside its debt limit for constructing a municipal 
auditorium, the SJC stated: 
[T]he construction of a municipal auditorium for public exercises 
and hearings, political rallies and other meetings in the exercise 
of the constitutional right of assembly, and exhibitions incidental 
to municipal functions such as exhibits of the work of public 
school pupils and fire prevention and civil defense displays ... 
would be a public purpose and if the statute limited the city to 
the construction of such a hall it would be constitutional. We 
think that the additional references to "an exhibition hall" or to 
"conventions and other shows and gatherings" do not derogate 
from construing the statute to be constitutional.26o 
Public parks, public beaches, municipal civic centers, and mu­
nicipal auditoriums are all forms of recreation for which courts have 
found a valid public purpose to exist. In Massachusetts, no cases 
decide the issue of the public purpose nature of a stadium. There is, 
however, an advisory Opinion of the Justices discussing the pro­
posed legislation that authorized the Massachusetts Turnpike Au­
thority to construct a stadium in which the SJC states: 
[A] large multi-purpose stadium or an arena for public activities 
and events, conventions, professional and amateur athletic 
events, and other large gatherings may be for a public pur­
nflC'O Tho T t:Itol"r;coll'ltl1 .... .a. m .... 'T ....ooSr\-nl'lhln rlot-co .....,.....,,;..,a th .... + .h£'u.. ~ 
YVU"""o • •• ..1..1.1.'" ..L..J""'5.l~.lULU.1"'" 1.1.UJ .l\,,<U V.1.lClU.lJ U"",,L\..-..L.l.H.H.l\.o UIUL LJ..I'-'I,"-, 
258. Kingman v. City of Brockton, 26 N.E. 998, 998 (Mass. 1891) (emphasis 
added). 
259. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841 (Cal. 1982) 
("'Activities which promote recreation of the public constitute a public purpose."') 
(quoting Alameda County v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 80, 85 (Ct. 
App. 1964)); Ginsberg v. City of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 688 (Colo. 1968) (en banc) 
(providing that a sports stadium is for the recreation of the public and is for a public 
purpose); State v. Osceola County, 752 So. 2d 530, 538 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam) ("We 
have on numerous cases approved as a public purpose the development of recreational 
facilities."); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966) ("A sports 
stadium is for the recreation of the public and is hence for a public purpose."); Mount 
Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, 936 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 
("Public recreational facilities constitute a public purpose and function."). 
260. City of Boston v. Merch. Nat'l Bank of Boston, 154 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Mass. 
1958). 
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are economic, civic, and social advantages . .. from providing . .. 
a stadium and an arena large enough to attract conventions and 
similar gatherings and to provide for audiences sufficient to sup­
port enterprises of interest to large numbers of people, and suita­
ble to provide recreation and instruction to citizens and 
others.261 
In its opinion, the SJC did not directly address the issue of recrea­
tion but merely looked at the proposed statute. 
As previously noted, other jurisdictions have held that the con­
struction, operation, taking, or management of a stadium facility 
would create a valid public purpose on the basis that such activity 
constitutes public recreation, therefore, expanding the eminent do­
main remedy permitting property to be taken for recreational pur­
poses. The California Supreme Court has upheld the principle that 
anything calculated to promote the education or recreation of the 
people is a proper public purpose.262 New Jersey courts also sup­
port this principle. A New Jersey court upheld an act creating a 
special public entity to build a sports complex, through eminent do­
main if necessary.263 The court observed that "the view that the 
construction and maintenance of stadiums and related facilities con­
stitutes a public purpose has received virtually universal approval in 
most jurisdictions."264 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in sus­
taining an ordinance that authorized a loan to construct a sports 
stadium, declared that "[a] sports stadium is for the recreation of 
the public and is hence for a public purpose; for public projects are 
not confined to providing only the bare bones of municipal life 
"265 
The City of Springfield argued the new civic stadium satisfied 
the public purpose requirement not only because of the recrea­
tional baseball use, but noted that the stadium could be used for 
other public purposes, because it would not be used exclusively for 
professional baseball. Besides only playing a limited number of 
games a year, the team would have many out-of-town games when 
the stadium could be used for other public purposes. The stadium 
could be used by young athletes attending the Springfield public 
schools to hold important baseball or softball games as well as host 
261. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969) (emphasis added). 
262. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 842. 
263. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. Y. McCrane 292 A.2d 580, 635-30 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Diy. 1971). 
264. Id. at 598. 
265. Martin Y. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966). 
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state semi-finals and final championship games. Area schools, col­
leges, and universities could make use of a new state-of-the-art 
sports facility for sporting and civic events. In addition, other fam­
ily-oriented programs, social, and civic events could be held in the 
new civic stadium. A new civic stadium would provide activities for 
the entertainment, enjoyment, and pleasure of Springfield citizens, 
and would serve a paramount public purpose by promoting tourism 
while providing a new forum for educational, recreational, and en­
tertainment activities. 
There are several types of economic benefits to the public from 
a new civic stadium on the Site. These economic benefits include 
jobs, taxes, and urban revitalization. The SJC held that "[r]educing 
unemployment and stimulating the economy are public pur­
poses."266 "'The reduction of unemployment and alleviation of eco­
nomic distress,' as well as the [s]timulation of investment and job 
opportunity ... are proper public purposes."267 "[F]oster[ing] the 
expansion of the economy and the reduction of unemployment by 
providing a role for state and local government in the stimulation of 
industrial development" has been deemed a valid public purpose by 
the SJC.268 
B. Court's Resolution 
The consolidated cases269 were tried before Constance M. 
Sweeney, Justice of the Superior Court, over several days in Janu­
ary 2000. After the trial, Judge Sweeney issued a memorandum of 
decision filed February 25, 2000,270 finding that the takings were not 
a valid exercise of the general eminent domain powers of the City 
and were not primarily made for a public purpose.271 The court 
invalidated and set aside the takings, pursuant to Judge Sweeney's 
issuance of a declaratory judgment and order for entry of judg­
ment.272 The City's claim to enjoin further statutorily required pro­
ceedings on the referendum petitions were rendered moot because 
the land takings were invalid.273 
266. Opinion of the Justices, 369 N.E.2d 447, 449 (Mass. 1977). 
267. Opinion of the Justices, 335 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Mass. 1975) (alteration in origi­
nal) (citations omitted). 
268. Opinion of the Justices, 366 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1977). 
269. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
270. City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., Nos. 1999138,991230,000014,2000 
WL 782971, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at *50. 
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The court's decision relies on two narrow and fact-specific 
grounds. First, the decision holds that "when a city exercises its 
power of eminent domain for the primary purpose of granting a 
leasehold estate to a private entity so that the entity can build a 
stadium for its baseball team, the public purpose is not c1ear."274 
The court held that, under those circumstances, additional legisla­
tion governing the relationship of the governmental entity and the 
lessee is necessary "in order to define the public purpose."275 
In support of its position, the court cited to and quoted the 
Opinion of the Justices: 
The provision of such facilities ... is not as clearly and directly a 
public purpose as supplying housing, slum clearance, mass trans­
portation, highways and vehicular tunnels, educational facilities 
and other necessities. As to such essential enterprises, the public 
objectives are well understood. The appropriate and usual meth­
ods of achieving them also, on the whole, are well established. In 
such cases, somewhat general standards of public convenience 
and necessity and principles of prudent, frugal government ad­
ministration, necessarily to be implied from the essential projects 
themselves, may adequately guide the expenditure of public 
funds, even where there may be involved arrangements with pri­
vate persons or entities operating for profit.276 
Judge Sweeney noted that the arrangement between the City 
and SBC did not prohibit SBC from assigning its lease to an entity 
operating a team for profit.277 As under the proposed lease terms 
such a profit-making enterprise would not owe any funds to the 
City, the court expressed concern with the potential private windfall 
that would ensue.278 The court also noted that in addition to own­
ing the team, SBC or its assignee could assess fees for civic uses of 
the stadium by entities other than the City.279 Since the profes­
sional baseball team's use of the stadium took priority over all civic 
functions, the court expressed concern over the absence of any 
standards defining the extent of such use.280 Judge Sweeney 
opined: 
274. Id. at *45. 
275. Id. 
276. 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969). 
277. Dreison Invs., 2000 WL 782971, at *41. 
278. Id. (citing Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 559-60, which noted same 
concern). 
279. Id. at *42. 
280. Id. 
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Before six million dollars of public money can be spent to ac­
quire land for the principal and immediate purpose of benefitting 
a not-for-profit corporation, and potentially to benefit a profit­
making enterprise, legislative standards and principles must be in 
place "to protect all aspects of the public interest and . . . to 
guard against improper diversion of public funds and privileges 
for the benefit of private persons and entities?81 
As Springfield faced one roadblock after another in its at­
tempts to secure a franchise, the pursuit "for a professional baseball 
team took on a life of its own."282 The court concluded that by the 
time of the taking the City had departed "from its basic obligation 
to protect the public interest and guard against improper diversion 
of public funds and privileges for the benefit of private persons and 
entities."283 The court found that, at the time of the takings, the 
public was not the "primary beneficiary of the City's contribu­
tion. "284 The proposed ground lease terms primarily benefited 
SBC, not the City.285 
As a second ground for invalidating the takings, the court 
found that the takings had to be set aside "even if legislation estab­
lishing standards for the City's proposed participation in the sta­
dium project were not required."286 According to the court, the 
evidence clearly and convincingly established that the City acted in 
bad faith when it exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire 
title to the land parcels.287 Judge Sweeney's determination that the 
City acted in bad faith in taking the land parcels is grounded mainly 
"on the actions and representations of the mayor in the events giv­
ing rise to the takings."288 As property cannot be taken without the 
mayor's approval,289 his intent is of import. The court found that 
facts demonstrate that "until sometime in 1997, city officials were 
primarily motivated by the public interest in their efforts to attract 
professional baseball to Springfield."290 Judge Sweeney made fac­
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at *47. 
284. Id. 
285. See id. at *49. 
286. Id. at *45. 
287. !d. 
288. Id. at *46 ("The actions, words and knowledge of the mayor, acting within 
his authority, are attributable to the City.") (citing Pheasant Ridge Assocs., Ltd. v. Bur­
lington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Mass. 1987)). 
289. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 30 (2000)). 
290. Id. 
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tual findings that the project initially sought to serve many tangible 
and intangible public purposes, i.e., providing family-oriented activ­
ities, increasing business for the hotel, restaurant, and cafe trades, 
providing increased opportunities for employment, revitalizing the 
central business district, and increasing public spirit and pride.291 
There is no specific instant that indicates the City's departure 
from its responsibility to safeguard the public interest and prevent 
the improper use of public moneys and privileges for the benefit of 
individuals and entities.292 The court declared that it was a gradual 
process evidenced by the mayor's disregard for separate interests in 
the stadium project.293 Judge Sweeney noted that the City did not 
seriously endeavor to separate the City and SBC's shared objective 
of local professional baseball from their distinct financial interests 
in the project.294 The court also found that bad faith was estab­
lished because the mayor and his agents, in applying for the CDAG 
and PWED grants, knowingly made material misrepresentations to 
the Commonwealth for the purpose of securing four million dollars 
in state funding for the stadium site.295 
For the above reasons, the court found the takings invalid as a 
matter of law, rendering moot the city's petition to prevent the ref­
erendum process.296 The court set aside the takings in accordance 
with the court's Declaration of the Rights of the Parties and Order 
for Entry of Judgment.297 In this Declaration, the court perma­
nently enjoined the City "from asserting any further claim to title in 
the properties" and enjoined the City "from taking any further ac­
tion with respect to the referendum petitions."298 The court further 
ordered that the City "take all reasonable and necessary action to 
restore clear title to the properties," and held that the owners of the 
property had a right to proceed against the City with claims for 
monetary damages, if any, caused by the cloud on its title by reason 
of the invalid taking order.299 
Although the City strongly objected to the factual findings as 
well as legal reasoning of the decision, no appeal was taken as the 
parties reached a negotiated settlement of all claims in the case by 




295. [d. at *48. 
296. [d. at *50. 
297. Id. 
298. /d. at *2. 
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means of the City reconveying title to the land to the former owners 
and the SBC paying monetary consideration in exchange for a re­
lease of all claims for damages against it and the City. 
CONCLUSION 
It does not appear under Massachusetts law that the state ref­
erendum statute applies to an eminent domain taking. Even if it 
were to apply, the provisions of the state and federal constitutions 
prohibit a referendum from undoing a taking by eminent domain. 
The court did not reach these issues in this case because the judge 
determined the underlying takings did not meet the public purpose 
requirement. All takings must be made for a public purpose to be 
legal. It remains to be seen whether in future cases, an eminent 
domain taking may validly be the subject of a local referendum. 
